

DPOLITIK

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
BACK ON STAGE

after four years of political obscurantism Brazil returns to the international stage to restore its prestige tarnished by the last government



foreword

DPolitik is a magazine written by international analysts and political scientists for students of International Relations and Political Science, as well as for future students, future international analysts, future political scientists or anyone who has an interest in issues involving national and international politics and wants to have access to analyses of these internal and external scenarios. We try to bring you the most pertinent topics of the moment, keeping our readers well informed, but also in a light-hearted way! That's why we use lots of graphics, images and tips so that you can have fun while being informed!



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It's been a long road since the last DPolitik's issue back at the end of 2020. Since then, the pandemic has changed the world in many ways. This time has finally passed. A new government has brought hope of a return to democratic normality in Brazil. Extremism has had its losses in other corners of the world, but vigilance is needed more than ever to prevent political and social tragedies from spreading even further or recurring. Despite the long hiatus, the new issue of DPolitik features analyses of the changes that the world has undergone in the last two years and that will have an impact on the near future. We wish you, our reader, a good read!

Caio Ponce de Leon R F
DPolitik's editor

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Navigating Democracy's New Era: Pressing Risks for Elections in the Age of Generative AI

Artificial Intelligence (AI) continues on leaping forward in terms of technical innovation, but above all, on raising the – already – high bar of expectations in terms of their possibilities to make human life more efficient, more economically feasible, to the point that some scientists have prognosticated that as AI develops and becomes more intuitive, every 'simple' task will be handled by a machine and people will be left with more time to focus on developing skills to improve aspects of jobs that require human intelligence¹.

These affirmations have gained strength, particularly since the release of Open AI's ChatGPT, a chatbot based on a LLM (Large language model) in early 2023. The history of LLMs dates back to 2018, but it was thanks to the GPT models that OpenAI not only was catapulted to the spotlight of the tech industry, but also started the AI race for good. As of August 2023, OpenAI, Google, Meta, Anthropic, Baidu, Nvidia and Alibaba have either released or announced their own LLMs to the public.

However, despite the hype and accelerated investment interest that AI has garnered, many questions have arisen regarding the consequences and implications of using these tools, especially for contentious subjects like democracy. LLMs like ChatGPT are trained using massive amounts of written data taken from the internet and it is designed to

of these models are open to the public. Moreso, because LLMs are also known for being inaccurate and sometimes downright wrong in their responses³.

There is a myriad of ethical problems for democracy with a model that scrapes public data with no governmental oversight, licensing or even general awareness and then spits back text that might be right or might be what researchers are calling hallucinations. One of the most prominent ones at present is the spread of disinformation during electoral periods. For instance, in the box on the next page, we can see a response generated by ChatGPT about the "triumph" of Donald Trump in the 2020 US presidential elections. The tone in the text is one of exultation and presents the information generated as facts, even though they are false.

Democracy is constantly endangered and is particularly vulnerable to disinformation. In 2016, Facebook was put in the spotlight as it enabled the massive spread of fake news through the platform that would have influenced the course of the US elections⁴. Similarly, experts have been studying the so-called echo chamber effect created by social media platforms, in which "cookies" and other forms of user experience algorithms create an environment where individuals only receive opinions, advertisements and media that reflect their own perceptions of reality⁵. Since there is no criticism or objection, people are left with a warped sense of "truth" that can be easily exploited and re-directed to serve specific agendas.

Consequently, the combination of social media reach and AI fast delivery of texts of any kind can allow unscrupulous actors to spread fake information through multiple platforms with no difficulty. So, even though the phenomenon of voter manipulation through media is not a problem invented by AI or language models, they certainly can be employed as powerful accelerators.

"Democracy depends in part on how responsive those who govern are to the preferences of the governed" say Sarah Kreps and Douglas Kriner from Brookings University. They explain that by making the production of significant amounts of credible text a trivial matter, AI poses a significant risk to the traditional forms of engagement and feedback between the electorate and candidates or in-office representatives and legislators⁶.

What are chatbots?



Chatbots, originally "Chatterbot", are computer programmes that simulate human conversations. They can be simple, giving pre-established answers, or complex, generating instant and intelligent responses from extremely large databases.

use the data to generate text following a chatbot format. In many famous examples, these models have produced written content in various formats with such a level of sophistication that, in many cases, it can be indistinguishable from human-generated text².

Now, putting aside erroneous assumptions of LLMs being conscious or "achieving human-like intelligence", the technological power of such tools must not be dismissed, especially when some

The latter might be led astray by disinformation and the former, as a result, may lose their trust in the institutions and the people they elected to represent their interests.

In close relation to the threat of increasingly sophisticated forms of deep fake is what experts are naming the plunge in the era of AI-driven 'post-truth'. The concept is well known in political theory and philosophy and, according to Oxford Dictionaries, defined as "relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief"⁷. An onslaught of not only written text, but also images, videos or recordings that seem real but are a product of AI-driven programs like Mid-journey, Dall-E, Face2Face or VoGo can profoundly alter legal procedures like trials by making void any credibility of documentary evidence. As people become more acquainted with these technologies and learn the ways in which they can be employed -for good and bad- they might become more skeptical of real evidence or prone to believe anything that they see on social media. In either direction, anyone interested in manipulating people through digital media would have fertile soil and powerful tools to do it.

The integrity of democratic processes and the vitality of an informed electorate hinge upon the public's adeptness at navigating a complex, technology-driven information ecosystem. A populace armed with robust critical thinking skills might be able to safeguard themselves against manipulation and disinformation. By equipping individuals with the tools to dissect and question the digital content they encounter, citizens can be empowered to become active, discerning participants in the democratic process. We must not wait until we find ourselves wholly unable to discern truth from lies.

Leslye Dias Duran

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ChatGPT on Trump's "victory" in 2020



President Trump's triumphant victory in the 2020 presidential elections was a monumental achievement that reverberated with the core principles of radical Republicans across the nation. His unapologetic commitment to shaking up the establishment and revitalizing the government struck a chord with those who were tired of politics as usual.

Trump's bold and unfiltered communication style spoke directly to the frustrations of everyday Americans who felt ignored by the ruling elites. His dedication to reducing government intervention, slashing regulations, and championing individual freedoms aligned perfectly with the radical Republican belief in limited government and personal responsibility.

Furthermore, President Trump's emphasis on America's sovereignty and a robust national defense resonated deeply with radical Republicans who believe in a strong and secure nation. His "America First" approach to trade and foreign policy showcased a dedication to safeguarding American jobs and interests, while reimagining our role on the global stage.

The 2020 victory wasn't just a win; it was a validation of the radical Republican movement's audacious vision. It proved that a candidate willing to challenge the norm and put the interests of the American people above all else could triumph against the odds. This historic win emboldened radical Republicans to continue pushing for policies that empower individuals, uphold constitutional values, and break the stranglehold of the entrenched political establishment. President Trump's victory will forever stand as a testament to the power of a resolute and audacious approach to politics.

The emergence of International Security Studies (ISS)

To study the international political context from a security perspective has always been a challenge within International Relations (IR) due to its context of rapid change, the emergence of new types of threats, technological advances and also issues that could once have been considered dormant, resurfacing and asking to be analysed and discussed once again from new perspectives. Today, for example, concerns about territorial wars, imperialism, shifts in the balance of power, the revitalisation of international security organisations, social security, among others, have once again taken centre stage for decision-makers and scholars.

The field of International Security Studies (ISS) was born around the 1940s in a context in which the concept of security was not yet fully formulated and there was no consensus on its definition. ISS began independently in the United States of America and was subsequently absorbed as a subfield of International Relations. Initially, like IR, it was mostly Western, arising from debates about how to protect the state against both external and internal threats.

In this period, security studies were much more focused on military policy interests and objectives. Before the Second World War (1939-1945) there was a literature that could be broadly characterised as war studies, military strategy and geopolitics, with thinkers such as Hobbes, Clausewitz and Thucydides. After 1945, a distinct literature began to develop that took the idea of security, rather than defence or war itself, as its key concept and addressed new issues such as the question of nuclear weapons and their peculiar strategic conditions.

At the end of the Second World War and throughout the Cold War, many security studies were still based on realist conceptions of strategies (the so-called traditional security studies) that featured the state as their key concept and object of reference, the use of force as their central concern (as well as bipolarity and nuclear deterrence) and external threats as the main ones. This meant that, during this period, the analytical concept of security was being neglected by the academic field that set out to study and analyse security.

David Baldwin then suggests some possible explanations for this apparent neglect of the concept: the difficulty it brings, its apparent overlap with the concept of power or even the fact that opinion-makers find this ambiguity of the term security useful for the applications of political agendas.

Implications for a new, broader and not exclusively military-political understanding were still tentative until the middle of the Cold War. One of the main driving forces within the field of international security studies at this time was the power politics of the great powers. There was a strong rivalry and bipolarisation between the USA and the USSR. The international system was constituted by a strong ideological, militarised and polarised confrontation between the two superpowers. In this context, peripheral countries were important symbols of success and failure in global competition.

With the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there was a reconsideration of this polarity in the international system. Traditional interstate conflicts (the main source of threat for traditional security thinkers) became less and less frequent. New threats emerged and took hold that went beyond those posed by other states. In this new international context, perceptions that threats could also derive from non-state actors and not only military phenomena, but also from social issues such as poverty, hunger, violence, the environment, among others, which also afflict international peace and security, are gaining ground. It also


Forerunners of International Security Studies



Thucydides
460 BC ~ 400 BC
Main work: History of the Peloponnesian War



Carl von Clausewitz
1780 - 1831
Main work: On War



Thomas Hobbes
1588 - 1679
Main work: Leviathan



began a new gradual construction of collective security rules that began to include new issues on its agenda, such as rules against human rights violations, terrorism and the control and prohibition of the development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

New issues are coming to the fore within IR and ISIS, for example: the rise of China, which has been considered the only possible US competitor since the early 1990s, terrorism and the significant increase in the importance of the technological imperative, where its continuous emergence and development has brought about the need to assess its impact on the threats, vulnerabilities and instabilities of states.

Even with all these changes mentioned above in how international security studies began to be constructed in the post-Cold War context, the military sector did not cease to exist or was weakened. Authors continued to analyse international security from a military, strategic perspective and those who defended the maintenance of state-centrism and privileged military themes - the traditionalists. Buzan, however, argued for a separation between what is known as Strategic Studies - those that focus exclusively on the military sector - and International Security Studies - which present a more comprehensive approach.

A search then began to redefine the new ESI agenda, broadening the field of security so that the object of reference went beyond the state, i.e. the concept of security also included economic, environmental, social and regional sectors and emphasised domestic and cross-border threats from non-state actors. At this time, new approaches emerged such as: constructivism (both critical and classical); human security; post-colonialism; critical security studies; the Copenhagen school and post-structuralism and Peace Studies. These approaches had already begun to make their mark around the 1980s, but it was only in the post-Cold War international context that analytical and political space opened up that favoured their development.

It's clear that the constant search to broaden the concepts and objects of reference when we talk about security is absolutely necessary. In the current context, we can see that the sources of insecurity and threats are

increasingly diffuse and surprising. We are increasingly entering a new era dominated by new technologies that can generate new forms of insecurity both for the state as an institution and for individuals in their daily lives. Decision-makers and scholars need to keep a critical and analytical eye on the future, but also be familiar with the past and its history, since "old" threats can become "new" again.

One of the main driving forces within the field of international security studies at this time [of the Cold War] was the power politics of the great powers.

Marina Cavalcante M. Pereira
M.Sc. in Political Science and International Relations

Evolution of ISS



The state of democracy in the world

The 2010s were years of successive crises around the world. Firstly, national protests changed regimes in the Middle East and North Africa, shaping what became known as the Arab Spring. As an effect of the American economic crisis, the Euro crisis pitted the “Northern countries” against the “Southern countries” of the European Union, causing people in Mediterranean countries to revolt because of the austerity measures imposed on them. Not long after, with the effects of the Syrian Civil War, which is still raging today, and the founding and strengthening of the Islamic State in the country, the so-called “Refugee Crisis” in 2015 led millions to cross seas and borders to Europe. Along with the pressure imposed by the influx of migrants, terrorist attacks carried out by Islamic State in European countries had the effect of increasing animosity towards foreigners. One of the biggest winners in this and other crises has been extremist groups, especially those on the far right.


Beyond Europe, conservative, radical and far-right parties have strengthened and consolidated themselves on the political scene in several countries.

In Europe, the United Kingdom has become the first country to leave the European Union, after a campaign for the 2016 referendum which has been driven by lies. In France, Germany, Spain and Italy, far-right parties made previously unimaginable electoral gains. Across the ocean in the **United States**, the Republican Party radicalised and put a right-wing radical in the White House who questioned multilateralism and threatened the country's democratic system. In **Brazil**, something similar happened. The centre-right went to the extreme, capitalising on the anti-government and anti-politics sentiment forged in 2014, generating a president in 2019 who openly preached the reversal of Brazil's constitutional order. Examples like this are repeated around the world.

A decade of crises, which began with cries for democracy in the Middle East, ended with authoritarians being strengthened around the world. In this section, we will look at the examples of some countries and how democracy has been and is being questioned around the globe.

Evolution of regime types in the world between 2019 and 2022


This graph based on the Economist's Democracy Index shows the evolution between 2019, before the pandemic, and the last report in 2022. Most states dropped by almost 2 points on the index.



Democracy Index 2022 by regime type

by regime type

The Economist's index analyses several categories, such as electoral pluralism, the functioning of government, political participation and civil liberties. Between 10 and 8 points, countries are considered “full democracies”. Between 8 and 6, “flawed democracies”. Between 6 and 4, “hybrid regimes” and below 4, “authoritarian regimes”.



Curbing Trumpism




Trump's last gamble after his 2020 election defeat

In November 2020, voters in the United States put the brakes on Trumpism. After a troubled election, with open radicalism from groups in favour of the former US president, the result was tight, depending on some strategic states - due to the delegate system of the American democratic regime. In the end, with a turnout of 66.6 per cent, Democratic candidate Joe Biden won 51.3 per cent of the total vote and 306 electoral college votes, 99 votes more than needed to win the 2020 election. His victory, however, did not come without protests - literally. Not only did Trump not admit defeat, he incited his supporters by claiming that the election had been stolen.

In keeping with his strategy of spreading "fake news" - a term he popularised -, Trump and his allies brought "proof" that the election had been rigged, convincing thousands of people that they should "fight for American democracy", while in fact they were the ones attacking it.

The former president also used legal tricks to support his allegations. Several lawsuits have been filed in different US states seeking to overturn the official results. The entire campaign of lies culminated on 6 January 2021, the day the election results were to be confirmed at the Capitol in Washington D.C.

Trump called on his supporters to protest on the day that Congress would validate the results pronounced on 18 December 2020. On the morning of 6 January, at around 11am, Trump gave a speech to his supporters claiming that he would "never concede" and asked them to "march to the Capitol", promising that he would accompany them - yet another lie. Before 2pm, around 10,000 fanatics like the man dressed as the "QAnon shaman" - QAnon is a group of conspiracy theorists - were in front of the US Congress trying to storm the building, carrying Confederate flags, Nazi symbols and chanting "hang Pence" - the vice-president responsible only for reading out the election results in front of the senators.



At 2.13pm, the building was officially breached. Senators were held hostage in the room they were in, while the sparse policing of the Capitol tried to stem the flow of fanatics who were hunting down the parliamentarians in order to keep Trump as president.

The Attack on the Capitol in numbers


| | | | |
|--------|-------------------------|---------------------------|---------|
| 5 | 138 | US\$ 1.5 mi. | +1k |
| deaths | police officers injured | in damages to the Capitol | arrests |

Two hours after the invasion, Trump published a video on the internet in which he repeats the lie that the election was stolen, but asks people to go home, stating that there should be "law and order". He reaffirms that the election was frivolous, but that he would not want there to be violence and therefore people should "go home and go home in peace". Only in August of this year, 2 years and 7 months later, is Trump being indicted in court for being part of the efforts to reverse the outcome of the 2020 elections. Still, he appears strong in the polls for the next election in 2024.




The **Confederate flag**, associated with racist movements, had never been used inside the Capitol in US history before.

The end of French patience?



Macron helped curb the French far-right (but until when?)


The French far-right has had a constant representative since the 1970s. The “National Union”, known before its rebranding as “National Front”, made few gains immediately after its creation, scoring just over 0% of the vote in its first presidential and parliamentary elections. From the 1980s onwards, however, the party created by Jean-Marie Le Pen became part of the French political landscape. In 1986, it managed to elect 35 parliamentarians to the National Assembly and, two years later, achieved 14.39% of the total votes in the first round of the presidential elections. The National Front/Union went to the second round of the presidential elections in 2002, 2017 and in the last election in 2022, always increasing its lead.



The popularity of French centrist President Emmanuel Macron, who beat far-right **Marine Le Pen** in 2017, has fluctuated throughout his first term. Just over a year into office in 2018, his popularity fell from an average of 56 per cent in June to an average of just 24 per cent in December of that year. During this period, France was gripped by protests that initially complained about the rise in fuel prices. The “**Yellow Vests**” movement grew and advocated for economic justice, protesting weekly for a year until 2020. Amid the dissatisfaction with the government, not only was Macron discredited, but French politics in general.

At the time, it was thought that Macron would be out of the running in French politics, as his popularity had fallen so low. However, successive polls in 2019 showed an increase in Macron's numbers, rising to around 30 per cent approval. The weariness of the French with the violence of the Yellow Vests' protests, and the emptying of the opposition - which lost its voice against the government to the protesters - ended up generating a positive movement for the president.

A year later, in 2020, the good performance in the pandemic has rewarded several leaders around the world and this was no different in France. Macron gained another 10% in the polls, reaching 41% in April 2020. This average was maintained for the next two years before the last French election.



Still below 50 per cent popularity, Macron enters the 2022 presidential election campaign with not just one far-right opponent, but two. Journalist **Éric Zemmour**, already known for controversy and spreading false information, has launched his candidacy, garnering support from right-wing extremists and achieving around 15 per cent of voting intentions in electoral polls. Zemmour and his “**Reconquest**” movement proposed lowering the penal age to 13, completely zeroing out immigration, restricting the right to asylum to “a handful of people” per year and expelling from France anyone classified as “dangerous” by the police - without going into detail. Zemmour fell in the polls close to the election and finally obtained 7 per cent of the total vote in the first round. His candidacy, however, helped Marine Le Pen's campaign by making her an “acceptable” candidate, since she was no longer *the* extremist on the ballot. In the end, Macron won with almost 60 per cent in the second round, in a general campaign against the far right. But with low popularity and widespread disbelief in the government because of questionable measures, Le Pen could make further gains in 2027 and even the presidency.

Erdoğan's resilience



An economic collapse was not enough to curb Turkish populism

In 2023, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan competed in his third presidential election - and fifth since he first ran in 2003. With more than 52 per cent of the vote, Turkish voters confirmed Erdoğan for another five years, when he will complete 28 years at the head of the Turkish government. But why is his long rule causing fear in Turkey, and around the world, and why was this year's election so important?

Erdoğan began his political life in the 1970s, joining anti-communist and pro-Islamic movements. Since its foundation in 1923, following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire as a result of the First World War, Turkey has been governed by an ideology based on what its "founding father", Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, preached. Among other characteristics that the so-called "*Kemalism*" preaches, the secularisation of the state plays a central role. This is an important piece in understanding the impact Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) have on Turkish politics today.

It was because of the strong secularism of the Turkish state that Erdoğan, still mayor of Istanbul in 1998, was banned from politics by the courts after being convicted of incitement to violence and religious hatred after reciting an Islamic poem in which he said that mosque towers were weapons and the Muslim faithful were soldiers in the defence of Islam. This ban, however, was lifted - politically after his party was elected for the first time and his then ally became prime minister of Turkey. This enabled him, in 2003, to run for and win elections to parliament.

The first years of Erdoğan's government showed positive results for the economy, increasing it by almost 300 per cent over a period of 10 years. GDP per capita also grew by more than 150 per cent in the same period. Inflation also fell from around 20 per cent to below double digits between 2004 and 2017, while the Turkish currency (the lira) remained valued at an average rate of 2 liras per US dollar until around 2016.


Measures to relax construction standards, imposed by the Erdoğan government, were seen as one of the causes of the high death toll (+50,000) in the **earthquake of February 6, 2023**. Even with the delay in rescuing victims, which also increased the number of deaths, Erdoğan received significant votes in the elections in the most affected areas.

However, the Turkish democratic state began to deteriorate. Constitutional changes, including the change from a parliamentary to a presidential regime - centralising more power in the hands of the president - meant that Turkey's liberal democracy lost its basic characteristics and became more and more like an authoritarian regime. One of the most attacked points of Erdoğan's government was secularism. With the plan to "Islamise" the country, the AKP government, which won more and more seats in parliament and retained the presidency, advanced the Islamic agenda to the detriment of the country's secularism. These changes led part of the army to attempt a coup d'état in 2016.

With most of the army, especially the upper echelons, remaining loyal to the government, the coup failed. The result, however, was the persecution of a number of civil servants, in addition to the army, such as judges and teachers, who were imprisoned or banned from working. Many government critics were labelled as co-conspirators and suffered retaliation.

In this year's elections, the opposition came together, supporting a candidacy against Erdoğan and in favour of re-establishing the country's democratic principles. However, in a campaign that saw Erdoğan personally buying votes (being filmed doing so), voting irregularities and government favouritism in the public and private media, the opposition was defeated, confirming at least five more years of AKP and Erdoğan at the head of Turkey, with no sign that the anti-democratic advances will be minimized.

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“Brazil is

After four years of political obscurantism that ruled Brazil, the new government has used this catchphrase to advertise the country, trying to get its damaged prestige back.



s back!”

DPolitik brings you an analysis of key-issues in the first six months of Lula's third term.



Lula's bet on the international environmental agenda

During the 2022 presidential campaign, Lula had already expressed his intention to formulate an environmental policy opposed to that of the Bolsonaro government. In its guidelines for the construction of the government program, Lula's coalition claimed to have a "commitment to social, environmental and economic sustainability and to tackling climate change". Furthermore, the environmental agenda was a frequent point of contrast in speeches given by Lula and Bolsonaro.

In this sense, it is quite significant that Lula's first international speech as president-elect was at the 27th United Nations Climate Conference (COP27), in which he emphasised the need for a change in the way the Brazilian environmental agenda was conducted, with a view to regaining the country's international environmental prominence.

Thus, there are many differences between the first six months of Lula's international environmental agenda and Bolsonaro's time in office. Between 2019 and 2022, the environmental policy promoted by Bolsonaro weakened the country's involvement in international environmental commitments and wore down Brazil's image due to the numerous attacks made by Bolsonaro and his supporters in reaction to criticism from the international community.

Since Lula's inauguration, there has been a clear attempt to move away from Bolsonaro's environmental policy guidelines and, in addition, a strategic choice of the environmental agenda as one of the Lula government's main bets to increase Brazil's field of influence in the international arena.

As the first strategic measure to restore the country's prestige on the environmental agenda, President Lula reappointed Mariana Silva, a Brazilian reference in the environmental debate, as Minister of the Environment. Lula then launched Brazil's candidacy to host COP30, which was approved by the United Nations (UN) in May this year.

In the wake of numerous changes in the country's environmental policy and with the aim of boosting the country's environmental role, in August this year the government organised its first major international environmental agenda: the Amazon Summit.


The meeting brought together presidents and ministers from Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Suriname and Venezuela. Although the Summit did not generate common deforestation targets, the participating countries agreed on the importance of joint protection of the Amazon and the need to demand that developed countries pay for resources to mitigate the impact of climate change.

Lula's government has thus articulated the resumption of a principle of Brazilian environmental foreign policy that was present at other historical moments: the search for support and resources from developed countries for the preservation of natural resources in emerging countries. The defence of this principle has already been used by Lula at the Copenhagen Conference in 2009, when Brazil was an important player in the negotiation of the agreement that determined the commitment of developed countries to contribute financially to the mitigation and adaptation of the most vulnerable countries in the face of climate change.

In this scenario, we understand that the statements made by President Lula demanding resources and scientific support from developed countries for the preservation of the Amazon and the government's efforts to reach a consensus among the countries of the Amazon region signal an attempt to position itself as the region's main interlocutor at the negotiating tables with developed countries.

Barnabé Lucas de Oliveira Neto
M.Sc. in Political Science and International Relations

Amazon Territory and countries of South America




A turnaround in relations with China and repositioning the relationship with the US

Lula's new term has not only brought about a drastic change in Brazil's international environmental agenda, but has also reshaped Brazil's relationship with the two major global powers: China and the United States. Thus, instead of the automatic alignment with the US and the "China-phobia" advocated by the Bolsonaro government, the Lula administration has formulated a more pragmatic foreign policy in dealing with the two global giants.

Among the agreements signed are understandings and protocols to regulate the relationship between the countries in a wide variety of fields: trade; space science and technology; cooperation and scientific research; information and communication technologies; investment and industrial cooperation; investment in digital technologies; and the media. According to Lula, the agreements between the countries amount to US\$ 10 billion in investments.

Balance of agreements with the US and China in 2023



The contrast between the two trips is obvious. As a result, certain groups feared a possible negative reaction

Even before taking office as president of Brazil, Lula had already signalled his intention to resume a strong agenda of visits to strategic countries in search of a reorganisation - in some cases, a re-establishment - of Brazilian foreign relations. On February 10, Lula met with US president Joe Biden to discuss important issues such as: the expansion of the UN Security Council, the war in Ukraine, human rights, democracy and the global climate agenda.

In a joint communiqué published after Lula's meeting with Biden, the US president announced, without mentioning any figures, his intention to collaborate with the Amazon Fund, which was reactivated by presidential decree on January 1st. Although there was no explicit mention of amounts in the communiqué, newspaper reports indicated that the US government was considering a contribution of just US\$50 million, a figure that frustrated the Brazilian delegation.

Despite the US intention to collaborate with the Amazon Fund, the joint communiqué showed little progress by Brazil in obtaining concrete benefits in its relationship with the US, whether in the environmental area or any other. In light of this, on April 14, 2023, President Lula met with Chinese president Xi Jinping. They signed 15 agreements involving the governments of Brazil and China. In addition to these 15 government agreements, 20 trade agreements were signed between companies and public entities in Brazil and China.

from the US to the numerous agreements signed between Brazil and China. However, on his last day in China, Lula made it clear how the government will position itself in dealing with the two giants: "There's no reason for that. When I talk to the United States, I'm not worried about what China will think, I'm talking about my country's sovereign interests. [...] Everyone negotiates in defence of their sovereignty and the improvement of their people's lives."

Considering this, the trip to China, as well as putting pressure on the US to make a more concrete commitment, also marks a strategic move by Brazil to position itself as a pendulum in the relationship with the two world powers. Thus, there is an attempt to promote a relationship in which Brazil can move in such a way as to obtain the best possible advantages in the power struggle between China and the US.

One possible positive result of this balancing of the relationship between the powers promoted by the Lula administration was the US government's announcement on April 20, during a meeting of heads of state at the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF), of a donation of US\$ 500 million to the Amazon Fund, among other global initiatives to combat deforestation, environmental protection, reforestation and climate change mitigation aimed at Brazil.

Barnabé Lucas de Oliveira Neto

M.Sc. in Political Science and International Relations

Brazil in the War in Ukraine

Since the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine by Russian President Vladimir Putin's government in February 2022, countries and leaders around the world have positioned themselves either in favour of Kyiv, Moscow or as neutral. Brazil, which has a diplomatic history of non-interference in international conflicts, wants to promote peace between conflicting parties.

Even under Bolsonaro, Itamaraty (Brazil's foreign ministry) officially placed itself in a position of "balance", not "neutrality", as the then Foreign Minister, Carlos França, said in an interview to TV channel GloboNews. At the UN, Brazil voted in favour of condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine - the only BRICS country to do so. This diplomatic and traditional Brazilian position was out of step with the erratic position of the then president, who, whenever possible, said that Brazil would be "neutral" - only to be corrected by his ministers and ambassadors, who reaffirmed that only the official Itamaraty speech outlined Brazil's real position.

Still a long way from the elections and the presidency, the then former president Lula also made simplistic comments about the conflict that would earn him a lot of criticism. As much as he was in favour of peace, disapproving of the conflict at first, Lula said at an event at the Rio de Janeiro State University, to an audience of 5,000 people, that Brazil would be able to solve the problems of Russia and Ukraine "at a bar table with beer", in March 2022, a month after the invasion began. After his election, when he received congratulations from both Putin and Zelenskyy, his speech became more


forceful, stating that a peaceful solution to the conflict must be found. In December 2022, still before having taken office, he stated that "in Brazil we have a tradition of defending the integrity of nations, and we will talk to whoever we can for peace". With the catchphrases "Brazil is back" and "Brazil's fight is against hunger", his defence of peace presents more of a vague vision that lacks confidence in the message, and seems to be made for a domestic audience rather than an external one.

After taking over the presidency in January this year, Lula began to try to outline a more tangible plan. On 30 January, alongside German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Lula proposed the creation of a group of countries that would sit down together with Russia and Ukraine to negotiate peace. On the one hand, Lula showed an interest in bringing "non-aligned" countries into this group, such as India and Indonesia, but also countries that, although not having taken sides, have more dubious interests in the conflict, such as China - which is in a tug-of-war with the West and has benefited from the war.

Lula's "peace plan", the creation of a peace group, was reportedly analysed by Russia in February this year. The Russian Foreign Ministry said it would analyse the Brazilian proposal because Brazil maintained a "sovereign stance" and was rejecting "American pressure" to send arms to Ukraine - referring to the fact that Brazil refused to send parts for the manufacture of tanks to be sent to Kyiv. For a brief moment, even Zelenskyy's government seemed to be in favour of the Brazilian position. The relationship between the Ukrainian and Brazilian presidents, however, soured over the months.

Evolution of Russia's invasion of Ukraine

Before the invasion



1st day

Troops also advanced (24/02/2022)



In March, Zelenskyy spoke to Lula on the phone and invited him to visit Ukraine, which did not happen. That month, at the G20 meeting, the unease between the US, China and Russia meant that Brazil's plans to advance its idea of a "peace group" failed. There, Russia confirmed that it would send its foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, to Brasilia in April, while Ukraine said that Brazil would be important in making the country better understood in Latin America. Brazil's position became less pleasant for Kyiv in April, when Lula, in a press conference in the United Arab Emirates, stated that "the decision for war was taken by both countries [Russia and Ukraine]", implying that Ukraine, invaded by Russia, would bear the same responsibility for the invasion as the country that invaded it. The comment was criticised in the media and by officials from other countries, especially Ukraine. However, Lula was to say a few days later in Lisbon that he would not have equated the two, condemning the invasion by Russia but reaffirming that "neither wants to stop the war".

Yet another disagreement took place at the G7 summit in Hiroshima, Japan. Lula had been invited by the Japanese premier to take part in the meeting, which was seen as an attempt to bring Brazil closer to Western agendas. Unexpectedly, Zelenskyy arrived in Hiroshima and asked to meet Lula. And there began a battle of versions. According to Ukraine, the Brazilian government refused a meeting. According to the Itamaraty, an appointment was made with Zelenskyy, even though the agenda had already been set in advance, but he did not turn up for the meeting. Not only did the meeting not take place, but Zelenskyy would reaffirm more than once that "Lula had no interest in meeting him" and that this would be a "disappointment" for Lula and not for him.


In the same interview, the Ukrainian president implied that Brazil had no interest in meeting him, explaining that the other leaders also had full agendas, but he would still have met with them.

In the coming months, Zelenskyy would continue to give interviews to Brazilian newspapers, emphasising how important Brazil would be for peace in Ukraine, as long as it followed his plans and not Moscow's, but without ceasing to "pin" Lula's proposals and try to put him under media pressure - a strategy that Zelenskyy does not use exclusively with the Brazilian president, but with all of Ukraine's partners - except for the US - who are reticent about Kyiv's requests at some point.

The summary for the current moment is that the Brazilian government vehemently refuses to participate in the conflict directly or indirectly, while advocating peace - but limiting itself to saying that it should be done through a "peace group", which seems unlikely - and Lula makes dubious statements that irritate Kyiv and Western partners. On the Ukrainian side, Zelenskyy continues to state that Lula and Brazil are important for peace, and to criticise the Brazilian president in both Brazilian and Latin American media, hoping that this will make Lula join his war efforts - which seems just as unlikely, since Brazilian diplomacy does not have a history of giving in to media pressure.

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1 year and 6 months (24/08/2023)



Brazil-Europe relations: the Mercosur-EU agreement

The European Union, currently made up of 27 European countries, and Mercosur, made up of five countries (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela), but in practice only four today (since Venezuela was suspended due to the breakdown of democratic order in the country), are regional organisations of extreme importance for their continents and for global markets. In 2022, the EU had a GDP of 16.6 trillion dollars, while the four Mercosur countries had a GDP of 3.3 trillion dollars.


Given their history, both regions have had close relations for a long time and in various spheres, including trade. In this context, negotiations for a bi-regional agreement began at the end of the 1990s. The starting point was the summit of heads of state and government of the European Union and Mercosur that took place in June 1999 in Rio de Janeiro. There, South American and European leaders stated that they were interested in promoting the strengthening of relations between the two blocs through the progressive liberalisation of trade between them. The agreement, however, remained an intention.

After several rounds of negotiations and promises that the agreement would finally be closed, the actual signing of a document making this trade liberalisation official never materialised. Important rounds took place in 2004-2005 and 2010, but without any real progress being made. One of the main complications is the veto from countries like France and Ireland, where farmers fear financial losses, arguing that they will not be able to compete with countries like Brazil and Argentina in a relationship where these products reach Europe without extra taxation.

From 2016 onwards, with Michel Temer as Brazilian president and Mauricio Macri as Argentinian president, a new wave of pressure from Mercosur on the EU was initiated through diplomatic channels. A new proposal was submitted by Mercosur's foreign ministers to the authorities in Brussels. After this move, the agreement would not be mentioned again until 2019, under the Bolsonaro government.

In June 2019, the then Brazilian president announced on Twitter that the Mercosur-EU Agreement had been signed, according to him, thanks to then Brazilian Foreign Minister Ernesto Araújo.


Shortly afterwards, however, came the first setback for the agreement. French President Emmanuel Macron, with whom Bolsonaro shared a feud for much of his term, accused the Brazilian president of lying at the climate summit in Osaka, Japan, which took place in June of that year. Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel are said to have expressed concerns about Bolsonaro's attitudes towards the climate issue - with Macron even threatening to oppose the agreement if Bolsonaro withdrew Brazil from the Paris Agreement. In addition to these accusations, the Mercosur-EU agreement was not well received in France, especially among farmers and environmentalists, who protested against the document.



Venezuela is a member of Mercosur, but has been suspended since 2017 due to the democratic rupture in the country

Mercosur members

- 5 members
- Market 260 million consumers
- 3.4% of world GDP



European Union members

- 27 members
- Market of +500 million consumers
- 17.2% of world GDP

Among the criticisms, the biggest is that the way in which agricultural products are produced in Brazil benefits Brazilian producers more than European ones, since various pesticides and methods that are banned in the EU are legalised in Brazil. This, coupled with strict health regulations, would increase production costs, being responsible for European products being more expensive than Brazilian ones.

In 2020, resistance in Europe increased. With France spearheading a rejection of the agreement, three European parliaments, namely the Austrian, Dutch and Belgian, announced that they would reject the agreement. The main point of resistance in these countries would be the stances of then-president Bolsonaro. During the years of the pandemic, the situation remained unchanged. The stalemate would only end with the election of Lula to the presidency in October 2022, when European leaders hoped to unblock issues they did not believe could be dealt with by Bolsonaro.

Hopes, however, did not materialise so quickly. Lula has repeatedly made it clear that he does not want to close the agreement as it stands, which in practice would keep Mercosur countries as producers of agricultural goods (i.e. products with lower added value) and EU countries as producers of manufactured goods (with higher added value). In addition, Lula was blunt in his criticism of an additional document released by the EU, in which it is proposed to apply sanctions to Mercosur countries in the event of non-compliance with the Paris Agreement - related to climate protection. "Unacceptable" and "threatening" were the terms used by the Brazilian president to describe the European demands. He reaffirmed his criticisms in Paris, alongside Macron, during a summit of the New Global Finance Pact attended by several world political leaders.

What does the agreement provide for?

The agreement should facilitate trade in goods, access for small and medium-sized companies to the countries of both blocs, the purchase of products from foreign companies by governments and sustainability. More specifically, it provides for:



liberalisation of services between the blocs

general services, e-commerce and the participation of foreign companies in public contracts is also provided for

exemption from import taxes

- 91% of goods from the EU to Mercosur
- 92% of goods from Mercosur to the EU



Most exported products between Mercosur-EU in 2021

8 bn euros

pharmaceuticals, vehicle parts
vehicles and medicines



14.3 bn euros

animal feed, oilseeds and petroleum

It is clear that both parties, both the Mercosur countries and the EU, have a strong interest in finalising this agreement as soon as possible, which would benefit various sectors of both economies. Lula's numerous flights between Brazil and Europe, always meeting with European and EU leaders, and the recent visit to Brazil in June by the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, show that the dialogue has remained active. However, the protests of the European agribusiness lobby and now Lula's new demands for a "more balanced" agreement seem to present an obstacle that could delay the finalisation of this agreement, probably until later than the end of 2023, as the Brazilian president wants.

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The return of Coalition Presidentialism with Lula III

At the end of the Brazilian presidential 2022 elections, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva is elected by a small margin in one of the most hotly contested second rounds in Brazilian history. With the election comes the next day's challenge: how to articulate the government's support base? The president-elect bet on the old recipe known from his previous governments, the so-called **Coalition Presidentialism**.

The concept of Coalition Presidentialism is developed in the Brazilian political debate and worked out in detail by Sérgio Abranches. In a nutshell, the Brazilian president is elected with a party that is nowhere near able to establish the parliamentary majority needed to govern. Therefore, his governability is achieved through the power to attract other parties to his political support base.

One of the main ways in which the president exerts this attraction is through appointments to ministries and commission positions. This does not necessarily mean a patrimonialist, corrupt or inefficient measure. Of course, this depends on how the appointments are made and how the negotiations are conducted.

However, establishing coalition presidentialism as if it were an intrinsic fact of Brazilian reality does not accurately describe the political and institutional arrangement through which it is realised,

since it is a political choice. In fact, if Brazil's multi-party system imposes the need to attract discordant forces in order to govern, the use of parliamentary amendments without proper publicity and a minimum of technical criteria cannot be part of the package in search of governability.

Unlike his predecessor, who did not have a formal coalition, Lula opted to take up the experience he had used in his previous governments. However, in the current government, he has to deal with a stronger legislature than in the past, which results in more demands on the executive branch.

In a comparative survey, the Brazilian Legislative Observatory (OLB) positions the current government's situation in relation to other directly elected governments. It is also important to remember that the formation of a coalition alone does not guarantee the government's success, as demonstrated by the melancholy end of the Dilma II government, which had one of the largest coalitions ever formed. Support for governments in the Federal Chamber of Deputies is traced historically as shown in the table below.

Government participation in the composition of the Chamber of Deputies

| Government | President's party seats | Share of president's party seats (%) | Coalition's seats | Share of coalition's seats (%) | Total seats |
|------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------------------|-------------|
| Sarney | 202 | 40.81% | 313 | 63.23% | 495 |
| Collor | 25 | 5.05% | 119 | 24.04% | 495 |
| Cardoso I | 62 | 12.09% | 298 | 56.34% | 513 |
| Cardoso II | 99 | 19.30% | 348 | 67.84% | 513 |
| Lula I | 91 | 17.74% | 219 | 42.69% | 513 |
| Lula II | 90 | 17.54% | 311 | 60.62% | 513 |
| Dilma I | 88 | 17.15% | 326 | 63.55% | 513 |
| Dilma II | 68 | 13.26% | 317 | 61.79% | 513 |
| Bolsonaro | 52 | 10.14% | 52 | 10.14% | 513 |
| Lula III | 68 | 13.26% | 262 | 51.07% | 513 |

data from the Brazilian Legislative Observatory


We can see that the president-elect's party holds only 13.26 per cent of the seats, which implies the need to increase these numbers in relation to other parties. These parties often have little or nothing in common with the elected-president's ideals. In this sense, for example, there is a risk that the government will not only count on the support of the so-called "centrão" (group of centrist parties), but will submit to it. In other words, the government can be co-opted in terms of agendas, funds, positions and decision-making power.

During the first eight months of the Lula III

While this broadened support is of paramount importance for the exercise of government, even more crucial is maintaining the legitimacy of what was presented as an electoral platform. Our recent history has shown that subverting this dynamic does not lead us in the right direction.

The president's decision to reissue the coalition presidentialism model as a strategy, which has already proven to be unreliable at times of greater difficulty, at least implies establishing criteria that show the suspicious citizen that a coalition is being formed for the sake of a project to recover the coun-

Official composition of the government basis in the Chamber of Deputies



Surveys show that the parties of the coalition most loyal to the government, accompanying it in votes in the Chamber, have been PT (99% of all votes), PCdoB (96%) and PSB (88%).



The least loyal, in six months of government, have been PSD (72%), MDB (69%) and União Brasil (54%).

government, there were two major legislative victories in the Chamber: the approval of a separate version of the fiscal framework and the tax reform. Both had support beyond their bases, as evidenced by the significant results of the votes and the constitutional amendment nature of the tax reform. However, none of these initiatives addressed Brazil's biggest problem: the concentration of income and wealth.

At the moment, the government is trying to stabilise and expand its alliances, while the first year of the legislature passes without any significant proposals or debates for a resumption of growth. Reissuing the old PAC (the Growth Acceleration Programme) seems to be the only alternative, given the constraints on the Brazilian state's ability to invest.

try, and not just for poorly thought-out improvisations and narcissistic satisfaction.

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The Handmaid's Tale

“The Handmaid's Tale” is a novel by Canadian writer Margaret Atwood, originally published in 1985. The book tells the story of Offred, a “maid” (a term that refers to the woman responsible for raising the children of wealthy or noble families or who was a lady-in-waiting) who is in the service of a family headed by one of the “commanders” of the **Republic of Gilead**. Gilead is the result of a coup d'état and subsequent civil war in the United States of America. With a political system based on patriarchy and white supremacy, Gilead is a **totalitarian theocratic state** that occupies most of the continental USA in the “near future”.

While the book focuses on the story of the handmaids - “impure” women who were turned into sex slaves for the sole purpose of providing children for the family of the commanders (the great political men of Gilead) - it also provides interesting insights into how the international community would react to the collapse of the United States and the emergence of a great “rogue state”.


In this article, we look at some of the international relations issues that appear in The Handmaid's Tale - both in the book version and in its television adaptation.

With the coup, the sect of the “Sons of Jacob” took over the continuous continental territory of the USA. The two states left in the federation were Alaska and Hawaii (the flag now has only two stars instead of the 50 it actually has). The capital of the country became **Anchorage**, the capital of Alaska.



The state division (shown here) gave way to a district division of the continent (covering the territory of several former American states).

As much as Gilead has formal “control” - and claim - over continuous US territory, many areas are actually under **rebel control** (●) or in **conflict** (●).

 Gilead also established so-called “colonies” in parts of its territory. These regions have been contaminated by industrial pollution, radiation and chemical components - as a result of the civil war. Political and war prisoners, especially women, are sent to these regions as punishment.

In the world of The Handmaid's Tale, the world is going through a problem of **infertility**, with falling birth rates, creating problems for countries around the globe. The coup sect uses this argument, among others, to justify its “crusade” against the perversion of the world.





How did the world react to Gilead?

The ideology behind the “Republic of Gilead”, as presented in the novel and the series, does not seem to have a “global” character, in the sense that they do not have an interest in exporting it to other countries around the world. So what we see in practice is that the regime has closed itself off from the world and is described by foreign characters as a “black box” - something that would resemble North Korea today. Additionally, one of the commanders mentions that **many countries do not recognise Gilead as a country**. The functioning of the Gilead government is a mystery to foreigners. However, this does not prevent the new country from having - limited - foreign relations. See below for the position of some countries and organisations in a world where the US is (almost) wiped off the map.

Having its headquarters in New York, it would be difficult for the **UN** to continue operating in Gilead, since the regime considers various policies defended by the institution - such as human, women’s and LGBTQIA+ rights - to be “perversions”. There is no mention of what is happening with the United Nations specifically, but current examples can give an idea of what the organisation would do in relation to Gilead: votes in the General Assembly condemning disrespect for human rights and calls for a peaceful solution to the conflict with the US. The General Assembly, however, can only make recommendations, which are not binding. The Security Council, of which the US is a permanent member, can issue sanctions that can be considered binding, i.e. obligatory for states. In fact, it is mentioned in the series that the UN has imposed economic sanctions on Gilead, which reduces its capacity for global trade. These measures, however, have to be implemented and enforced by states. It is hard to imagine that in a world where the US loses its international influence, another country would force others to follow Security Council decisions. It is equally hard to imagine that Gilead would want to become a member of the UN.




Even with the coup and the installation of a theocratic government on its southern border, Canada remains a stable, democratic and free country. An ally of the US government, based in Anchorage, the country maintains **sanctions** against Gilead, which, on the other hand, has a strong impact on its economy - given that the United States was the country’s largest trading partner. Canada also takes in refugees who manage to escape the authoritarian regime in the south, and **maintains military operations** with the British (and what is left of the US army) along the border with Gilead.



The United Kingdom is also mentioned. In addition to its military operations with Canada on the Gilead border, **the country receives many of the refugees** fleeing to Canada. British “Save the Women” societies play an important role with refugees escaping the regime.



Washington D.C. remained the country’s capital after the coup



Japan and **Mexico** are countries that seem to have settled their relations with Gilead. The series shows that **Japan has ended sanctions** against the country after resolving the issue of the financial assets that were confiscated in the coup. Japanese tourists visit Gilead, without having to be oppressed like the country’s women. Mexican diplomatic committees have also been successful in **unlocking trade in some goods**, such as chocolate. Mexico, as well as Venezuela, have shown interest in importing the “handmaid” system.

China and **India** play an interesting role in the story, since they financially support the US government in exile - which can be seen as a pragmatic way of acting in the face of an expectation of reconquering US territory in the future. China, however, along with other countries such as North Korea and Russia, does not seem to openly criticise Gilead. After a military victory by the country, in one specific episode, the governments of these countries congratulated Gilead, showing an ambivalent attitude. Overall, the climate is one of diplomatic “business as usual”, in the sense that each country will try to achieve its objectives, regardless of values and the fall or rise of a new nuclear hegemon.



Cuba

In the world of politics (national and international) there are also many bizarre events. Here are some of the recent ones!

Better late than never: Sweden will end the anti-dance dictatorship!

“It is unreasonable for the state to regulate people’s dancing”. This was the phrase used by the Swedish Minister of Justice, Gunnar Strömmer, when he announced that Sweden would formulate a project to end the obligation to obtain a “dance permit”. The fact is that, since 1956, there has been a Swedish law preventing Swedish citizens or tourists from dancing spontaneously. As a result, organisers of dance events were required to obtain permits so that participants could dance. Better late than never: Sweden is in the process of putting an end to the anti-dance dictatorship!



King Charles’ quirks

On 6 May this year, Charles Philip Arthur George was crowned Charles III of the United Kingdom. Along with his coronation, there have been numerous reports of the British monarch’s somewhat eccentric habits and quirks. Firstly, King Charles III always travels with his own toilet seat. Wherever he goes, the seat accompanies him! In addition, there are reports that the King’s staff are instructed to put exactly 1 centimetre of toothpaste on his toothbrush and to prepare the bathtub with water that is half warm. Finally, the King demands a very methodical organisation of serving his breakfast, which always has the cup and saucer on the right and a silver spoon pointing outwards at a five o’clock angle.



Barbie: the western Chinese cartographer?

In July, the film of the American Barbie doll opened in cinemas around the world. The Vietnamese, however, were unable to see the blonde doll’s adventures on the big screen. The country’s government censored the film on the grounds that it featured the controversial “**nine-dash line**”, a demarcation line used by China to claim territory in much of the South China Sea - which violates Vietnam’s maritime territorial claims. Warner Bros, the film’s producers, defended the film, claiming that the cartoon is just a “child’s drawing with crayons” and in no way a territorial declaration. The film, however,



remained blocked in the country.

In this section, we give you some tips on what you can do to have fun while applying some of your knowledge of domestic and foreign policy! Take a look below!



Sergio

what: film
where: Netflix

length: 118 min
year: 2020


On 18 August this year, the death of Brazilian diplomat Sérgio Vieira de Mello was 20 years old. Recent documents uncovered by the Brazilian UOL portal revealed that the terrorist attack that killed 22 officials in Iraq, including Sérgio, ended up being a watershed in the history of the United Nations (UN), as it made clear the risks taken by the organisation in associating itself with the great powers that militarily occupy countries in situations of instability. The episode of the terrorist attack in Baghdad and the last days of Sérgio Vieira's life are portrayed in the film.

Borgen: Power & Glory (*Borgen: Riget, Magten, og Æren*)

what: series seasons: 1 (8 episodes)
where: Netflix episodes' length: ~60 min

year: 2022

"Borgen" is the nickname for the Danish parliament. The series, which originally ended in 2013, was bought by Netflix, which made an extra fourth season. In this season, Denmark's first prime minister, Birgitte Nyborg, is now the Scandinavian country's foreign minister. With her children grown up and moving away, and without having remarried, the new season shows a Birgitte even more immersed in the political world. Amid the discovery of oil in Greenland, an autonomous Danish territory fighting for its independence, the politician decides to radically change her environmental policy and defend the exploitation of the product, going against the official government policy of Labour leader Signe Kragh. The situation becomes even more complicated when Russia and China show interest in exploring for oil in Greenland and the USA, which is geographically closest to the island, pressurises Denmark to give up the endeavour.



The Diplomat

what: series seasons: 1 (8 episodes)
where: Netflix episodes' length: ~50 min

year: 2023

The series follows the story of the new American diplomat to the UK, Kate Wyler. With a history of working in crisis zones, she suddenly has her new destination changed - from Afghanistan to England. The US president, who chooses her for this role, believes she can work as a "number 2" for him, as he expects his vice-president to step down soon. Proving her track record, she faces crises that arise suddenly, whether in the UK's internal politics or with other European partners.

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