In recent months, announcements in the media by journalists, politicians and analysts about the possibility, the beginning and even the fact that we are already living through a Third World War have made the term something normal, everyday and even inevitable. A century of systemic peace seems to have put some minds at ease and trivialised the meaning of a global conflict.
For the last two years, a war started by an enemy of the West has been making headlines around the world. Since last year, another war, this time carried out by an ally of the West, has divided opinion in this part of the global hemisphere. With the multiplication and growing number of actors involved in both conflicts, ‘war’ has become a common topic in newspaper offices, political debates and even discussions between acquaintances.
Not only is it normal for it to be reported, but it is also relevant for the population to know what is going on. In Brazil in particular, it seems that the time has come for International Relations and Political Science analysts. Increasingly, we are hearing analyses from researchers who have looked into the issues and know the ins and outs of conflicts and historical parallels. In this sense, it can be said that those who are interested in finding out about the conflicts taking place around the world have the opportunity to obtain information and analyses on these subjects.
However, the great evil of the Information Age is the superlative it brings with it. Never in the history of humanity has there been so much access to so much information as there is today. Anyone with access to the internet can ‘inform’ themselves on any subject they want. For most people, however, this ‘information’ is not only of poor quality, but it is often (very) far from reality. And this is not limited to the source used. Much is blamed on social networks (among which TikTok has been a scapegoat for various political actors and countries), but episodes such as the erroneous information about the Dollar/Brazilian Real exchange rate1, which caused a furore on social media, show how even sources said to be reliable can lead to error (whether intentional or not). Traditional newspapers, considered by many to be the actor par excellence from which quality information can be obtained, have increasingly put objectivity aside in search of more clicks to finance their newsrooms.
Of course, most sources can provide us with valuable and useful information so that we can get to grips with the facts. But in the midst of increasingly complex scenarios and the polarisation of opinions, people’s interpretations have left them increasingly either apathetic or extreme about the situations they are presented with. The more distant people’s perceptions become (and that includes not just ‘ordinary people’, but also decision-makers and opinion formers), the more dangerous the ideas they propagate or help to propagate become.
In a 2014 article for Foreign Affairs magazine, international relations theorist John Mearsheimer argued that Russia’s annexation of Crimea was not only Moscow’s fault, but also that of a West increasingly based on ‘idealistic’ principles2. As one of the great defenders of so-called ‘political realism’, Mearsheimer’s analysis boils down to the idea that: after the end of the Cold War, NATO, without purpose (since it was created to counterbalance the Soviet Union, which no longer exists), continued to advance towards the Russian border. This would have made Moscow fear for its own sovereignty, causing a hostile response to the possibility of Ukraine’s ‘Westernisation’ (i.e. entry into NATO and the European Union). The professor’s analysis was quickly countered by several points made in the article and lecture that advance this argument3, but it is above all because he seems to completely exonerate Putin from any blame (or personal ambition) over the illegitimate invasion of Ukraine, while meeting with pro-Kremlin leaders like Victor Orban of Hungary4, that Mearsheimer’s analyses tend to be considered (then as now) defences of a Russian revisionist policy.
There should be no doubt that Russia’s war in Ukraine is an illegitimate invasion of sovereign territory that cannot be justified under any prism of international law. Nevertheless, the argument raised by Mearsheimer does not seem (at all) void. When it comes to certain leaders’ perhaps lack of awareness of the consequences of their actions, the professor seems to be right. Let’s take the example of the war in Gaza.
Just like the war in Ukraine, the year-long conflict in Gaza can also begin at different times in history, depending on the reference point used. In the Ukrainian case, some say that the war actually began in 2014, when Crimea was annexed to the Russian Federation. In the Palestinian case, one can go back to the very foundation of the state of Israel in 1948. It’s not at all wrong to say that these conflicts have been going on much longer than we’re used to reading about in the news.
The reaction of Western leaders, however, to Israel’s war in Gaza is completely different from that in the context of Ukraine. Of course, the start of this (most recent episode of the) conflict in the Middle East came from a brutal terrorist attack on the Israeli civilian population on 7 October 2023, with the taking of hostages who, to this day, have no prospect of return (if they are still alive). However, the brutality with which the Israeli state has decimated the Gaza Strip only came to be (slightly) criticised after more than tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians were killed. While Western countries vehemently (and rightly) accuse Moscow of dehumanising the Ukrainian civilian population, most of these same countries defend the very same position taken by the Tel Aviv government.
These double standards were not without consequence. Countries from the global south began to point out the obvious distinction made by those countries that constantly try to teach them about concepts of democracy, peace and humanity. More practical effects were seen in the US elections, where the conflict in Gaza was an important topic for (de)mobilising voters in the Democratic camp of Kamala Harris5. Even the US president, Joe Biden, doesn’t seem to have been able to win any favour with the domestic electorate for his role in the Israeli conflict – on the contrary, he was often labelled as ‘humiliated’ by the Israeli prime minister6, 7. Washington’s position of defence of Tel Aviv is clear, given its interests in the region. The way in which the American government (and its presidential candidates) has dealt with the issue, especially with a view to the domestic public, has not been so clear.
As much as many people like to believe that politicians are part of another reality and only act according to what they want, the reality, once again, doesn’t match up to this picture. Politicians are a reflection of various parts of the societies from which they emerge, whether democratic or autocratic. Their visions of the world are also created in the midst of the reality in which they live and are based on the precepts that permeate the general thinking of the population.
The way in which German society (the population, the media and politicians) acts in relation to the tragedy in Gaza, focusing only on the terrorism of 7 October, while glossing over the widespread killing of civilians, the majority of whom are children, is easily explained by its history of guilt. On the other hand, the position taken by South Africa against the Apartheid system established and maintained by Tel Aviv at the International Court can also be explained by its history. What we can see, then, is that a misconception in society can lead to a large-scale social and political movement which, in turn, can generate very large-scale global consequences.
The pandemic has shown the power that conviction, often wrong, can have. Incorrect or outright false information about COVID-19 treatments increased the number of people taking antibiotics (which kill bacteria) to prevent or treat infections from the disease (caused by a virus)8. A study looking at the reasons behind anti-vaccine attitudes in the US showed that social factors, but also media consumption, had an effect on individuals’ views on vaccination9.
In a political context, it’s interesting to see how the conviction of many escapes reality. In a survey carried out in Germany before the US elections, more than 60 per cent of those interviewed believed that the Democratic candidate Kamala Harris10 would win the elections, even though the polls always showed that the race was close and, in many cases, this could benefit Donald Trump. In many newspapers, even on election day, there was talk of very close numbers, but also of a slight lead for Harris.
In a recent interview with Spiegel Magazine, former German Chancellor Angela Merkel was confronted about her stance against the immediate entry of Ukraine and Georgia into NATO in 2008. She defended a similar argument to the one raised by Professor Mearsheimer (that Russia could see this as ‘dangerous’ for its sovereignty and act militarily). The journalist, in turn, returned to Merkel, accusing her of being one of those responsible for the conflict, since she had barred Ukraine at the time. The journalist’s understanding is that if Germany hadn’t barred Kyiv from entering in 2008, Russia would never have attacked the country. Merkel rejects this hypothesis, but concedes that this is also a view shared by the Ukrainian president himself, Volodimir Zelenskyy.
If futurology isn’t very popular among social scientists, neither is the determinism that reality would have been different if the facts had been different. Knowing the current state of affairs, it would be more likely that the conflict that began in 2014 or 2022 would have happened earlier, not that it wouldn’t have broken out. This is because there is a clear example of this: months after the NATO summit in 2008, Putin invaded Georgia (much smaller than Ukraine).
These episodes show how the worldview adopted has an impact on the way individuals confront the most complex scenarios that are put in front of them. What’s more, when those who adopt these realities, far removed from the facts, are people of influence (whether media or political), the movement they help to generate cannot be ignored.
At the beginning of 2024, the German defence minister stated categorically in an interview that Russia could attack NATO within the next five years11. Sweden is in the headlines again, not for its ill-fated entry into NATO, but for warning its population to ‘be psychologically prepared for war’ and distributing new pamphlets informing the population how to act in the event of war12, 13.
Last week, the European section of the political newspaper ‘POLITICO’ published a headline with the headline ‘World War III has already begun, says former Ukrainian general’14. The British newspaper Sky News discussed the debate about a third world conflict following the permission given by the US, France and Great Britain to Ukraine to use long-range missiles15. The direct argument against the trumpeting of the nuclear apocalypse is that Putin’s reaction to this permission (to include in Russia’s nuclear doctrine the possibility of responding to these missiles with nuclear bombs) is nothing more than a bluff16. While not everyone seems to believe this view of things17, the problem of social perception (public, media and political) is even more relevant.
If the general perception sold (and adopted) by Western countries is that Russian threats are empty, this could lead to pressure or a willingness to act more vehemently in the conflict. On the other hand, if these assumptions are not shared by others, but no action is taken to avoid them, the result could be either way. These two scenarios can be seen in the following examples: while the Americans, French and British send and allow the use of missiles by the Ukrainians on Russian territory, the Germans restrict themselves and take the position of ‘non-actors’ in the conflict, rejecting the sending of these weapons18.
One of the great dangers of propagating a new world war is that it is a self-fulfilling prophecy. While the debate is gathering momentum among media and political players, it doesn’t seem to be gaining much ground among the population. In a survey carried out in May this year in 14 European countries, a clear majority of respondents were against sending national troops to fight in Ukraine19. On the other hand, between a third and just over two thirds of respondents in countries such as Estonia, Great Britain and Sweden seem to see no problem with their governments sending troops to carry out other services on Ukrainian soil during the conflict. This data leads to the conclusion that, although fighting directly with the Russians is viewed with fear, the fact that NATO members may have soldiers in Ukraine is not seen as something that could trigger a Russian reaction. However, this simple fact has already been mentioned by Putin as a ‘red line’ for the Kremlin20.
This shows how perception, much more than the facts themselves, is essential for making decisions that could lead to escalation of a global conflict. It’s also important to remember that, although the topic most often covered in this text has been the war in Ukraine, a conflict of global magnitude may not start on the borders of the Dnipro River.
There are currently many open fronts that could lead to a generalised conflict. Israel’s war in Gaza, which has now spread to Lebanon, shows no signs of abating either. Another volcano, currently dormant, is in Asia, more specifically in the Pacific, with the South China Sea and the island of Taiwan. The region had already been one of the focal points of Trump’s first term in office between 2016-2020. Now, analyses see Trump’s second term as uncertain for the region21, 22, 23. The next US presidency itself will be a challenge on several fronts.
In short, the global context points to a period of hostilities, extremism, polarisation and ‘parallel realities’, a mixture that is conducive to a warlike scenario. However, we shouldn’t believe that this is the only inevitable path to follow. Taking this stance is not only defeatist, but also dangerous, as it engenders the exact opposite of what one might want to avoid.
1 – https://www.reuters.com/fact-check/portugues/HU5MOXRQEJJCJJLAJGFWWZSBUE-2024-11-08/
2 – https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Why-the-Ukraine-Crisis-Is.pdf
4 – https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/john-mearsheimer-on-putins-ambitions-after-nine-months-of-war
5 – https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-68409546
6 – https://newrepublic.com/article/181406/netanyahu-humiliating-biden-israel-hamas-negotiations
7 – https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/oct/17/netanyahu-weapons-biden
9 – https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9228411/
13 – https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cjr4zwj2lgdo
14 – https://www.politico.eu/article/ww3-officially-begun-ukraine-ex-top-general-valery-zaluzhny/
15 – https://news.sky.com/story/why-is-there-talk-of-world-war-three-13256716
16 – https://www.politico.eu/article/putins-bluffing-on-nukes-says-top-nato-official/
18 – https://www.dw.com/de/scholz-keine-taurus-für-die-ukraine/a-70812610
20 – https://www.politico.eu/article/vladimir-putin-new-speech-ukraine-war-transnistria-nato/
21 – https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/11/20/trump-southeast-asia-china-foreign-policy-security-strategy/
22 – https://thediplomat.com/2024/11/trumps-return-and-the-future-of-the-taiwan-strait-conflict/
