With the upcoming International Summit on the Future of Energy Security in London—taking place this April 24th and 25th—questions about the current state of global energy security are sure to emerge. In particular, the current state of geopolitical (dis)order comes to mind, as reflected in the summit’s agenda: the Russian war in Ukraine, artificial intelligence, accessibility, critical minerals, climate change, investments, net-zero emissions, the global energy crisis, fossil fuel subsidies, among others. The discussion on these topics is endless and can follow a myriad of paths, seen through various lenses. This column aims to offer a general historical overview of these events so that our readers can make use of context and a notion of process when analyzing the course and importance of these discussions for themselves.
In that sense, the column seeks to outline a historical panorama of the main events responsible for the current situation of global energy security. As is common in this type of analysis, the focus is on the countries and events that have substantially shaped and altered the current geopolitical configuration. This is not to say that analyzing events in smaller or less powerful countries isn’t important, but rather that understanding the macro functioning of the interstate relations system inevitably requires understanding events and processes in those that built and reshape that system.
The end of World War II (WWII) marked a substantial shift in the European continent. The transition of the competition for hegemony—the power to set the rules of the international system, where most international interactions occur—from Western Europe to the US-Soviet Union binary meant the end of historical processes that had driven major Western conflicts—such as the Hundred Years’ War, the Franco-Prussian War, World War I, etc. No longer needing to compete amongst themselves, Germany, the United Kingdom, and France began to cooperate deeply.
With their defense assured by the United States, Western Europeans were able to revert their security expenditures into social spending. It was after WWII that the Welfare States developed—a set of policies, goals and directives aiming to protect the most vulnerable in society and to improve the overall quality of life: affordable or free education, accessible healthcare, family rights, unemployment insurance, and more.
This surplus also allowed for continued economic development which, combined with the cooperation made possible by peace, resulted in interdependence—Western European countries linked their economies, making future wars between them increasingly impractical. An example of this process was the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which tied together the once-competing economies of Germany and France, focusing on two key wartime resources: coal and steel. Germany would depend on French coal, and France on German steel. Security and natural resources were hence directly linked.
It was during this period that the modern formulation of European values was born—often pamphleted as long-standing traditions deeply embedded in European societies—such as the promotion of free markets, liberal democracies, rule of law, etc. What some authors call the “better angels of our nature”—the decline of inter- and intra-state conflicts worldwide, but especially in Europe—was achieved under U.S. protection and its rivalry with the USSR.
The subsequent division of Germany created the perfect conditions for the USSR to increase German dependency—a dependency that persisted until recently through the import of Russian energy. While Germany’s case was more extreme, other European countries, driven by free-market ideals and the concept of democratization through development, also became dependent on Russian energy imports.
As the case went down in history, Willy Brandt, the West German Foreign Minister at the time – and later chancellor – viewed the construction of the pipelines linking Bonn and Moscow as an opportunity for interdependence, arguing for a Wandel durch Annäherung (change through rapproachment). Similarly to what Western-Europeans had previously accomplished, Brandt believed that the interlinkage of German-Soviet economies would mean the end of any future conflict bwtween those two nations. Nixon feared the pipelines were a way to “detach Germans from NATO”, Carter imposed boycotts on the sale of pipeline technology to the Germans, and Reagan placed export controls on pipeline eqquipment. All to no avail. Needles to say Brandt turned out to be mistaken, mixing cause and consequence – interdependence until then had been a consequence of peace, not a cause.
As the years passed, the ECSC expanded, developed, and merged with other agreements to become the European Union (EU). European values were consolidated and internalized by all member states through a set of requirements for joining the bloc, as well as through continued practices and bureaucratic norms. As a logical consequence of these values and practices, in 2020 the Green Deal was implemented. Essentially, the Green Deal is a package of policies from the European Commission aiming to make the EU carbon-neutral by 2050. In practice, the Green Deal revises every existing law using climate criteria and introduces additional legislation on circular economy, reforestation or deforestation, agriculture, green renovation of buildings, biodiversity, and innovation.
The Green Deal was the flagship for the practice of European values—until February 2021. As a direct response to the Russian war in Ukraine and the aforementioned dependence on Russian energy, the EU introduced Open Strategic Autonomy (OSA). “Autonomy” because it’s a strategy aimed at reducing EU members’ dependence on Russian energy; “Strategic” because it does not aim for total autonomy (as in protectionism or economic nationalism), but rather autonomy with regard to specific actors—especially Russia—and specific agendas—like energy sources; “Open” because, while seeking to protect itself, the EU still believed in free-market values and openness to the world.
OSA became the turning point in how European values were practiced. No longer the beacon of liberalism and free markets, but also not entirely nationalist or protectionist, the EU found itself in an internal struggle between these two identities. The global rise of authoritarianism and the far-right shift in many member states only intensified these contradictions and internal debates within the bloc.
Across the North Atlantic, the United States was undergoing its own pivot. Since the 2000s, China had been adopting economic strategies rooted in neoclassical liberalism, while maintaining a largely technocratic and dictatorial political system, growing at a pace that allowed it to compete with the U.S. Its ability to compete were further enhanced by Bill Clinton’s belief that a China participant in the global market would be a China on its way to democratization. In his own words “Now there’s no question China has been trying to crack down on the internet. (Chuckles.) Good luck! (Laughter.) That’s sort of like trying to nail jello to the wall. (Laughter.) Needles to remind the reader that China grew and developed, created its own government-censored internet, and never democratized.
Concerns over China’s development triggered a return to Cold War-era containment strategies, as well as military, economic, and political logics of then. Yet, critics noted that China is not the USSR, and the era is not the same. Would the same tactics apply? For a time, the answer was no—but gradually, U.S. foreign policy began leaning more toward classic containment techniques.
The rise of AI—partially entwined with a new far-right global wave and its strong digital communication power—fueled nationalist and protectionist rhetoric worldwide, accelerating what had been a gradual shift in the U.S. The second-term victory of Trump marked a win for containment tactics and logic, now aimed at China. The U.S. redirected its attention and limited resources toward Asian allies, making clear that American protection could no longer be taken for granted in Europe, which was no longer a direct hegemonic battleground with Russia.
Where American protection once supported the EU’s Welfare States, its absence meant a return to defense spending and a sharp decline in public investment in Welfare. This change runs counter to EU values and identity and further strengthens far-right discourse and trends in Europe—already partially validated by OSA. If the historical experience with interdependence repeats itself, it will become evident that it won’t be enough to preserve EU cohesion—especially as nationalist and protectionist ideals surge.
In March of this year, Finland discovered a thorium reserve in its territory—specifically in the Peräpohja region—capable of supplying the world with nuclear energy. This radioactive chemical element poses fewer risks than uranium, as it produces less radioactive waste and does not generate plutonium as a byproduct. Although existing reactors, originally designed for uranium use, would need to be restructured to use thorium, the possibility of nuclear energy production on such a scale could be the solution the EU needs to reverse its energy dependency without sacrificing the Green Deal.
Even with this knowledge, the EU has recently proposed a “simplification” of the Green Deal—something most experts agree is a move to loosen the rules, allow interest groups more influence in drafting the final version of the text, and generally distance the new text from traditional European values. The simplification of the Green Deal, despite the opportunity presented by Finland’s discovery, reflects the transformation of European values—nationalizing and protecting their polis. In the best-case scenario, it is the image of a union veering far-right. In the worst, it is the image of the end of European integration.
References:
https://www.nber.org/papers/w31351
https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-simplification-green-energy-laws
