Ever since humanity took to the skies with airplanes, the risk of losing highly skilled pilots has always been a pressing issue. Since the final years of World War I, people began thinking about and attempting to design unmanned aircraft to perform certain types of missions. While drones are not new news, with the 20th century offering time and space for testing, such as the massive use of Lightning Bugs during the Vietnam War and later in the Lebanon War, it was the beginning of the 21st century and the Global War on Terror that took drones to a new level.
The First Drone Era (2001-2020) centered on the ability to distance U.S. and allied troops from the frontline and hunt down those they defined as terrorists, while simultaneously reducing the human cost—a factor that’s not only moral but also economic, since training an F-16 fighter pilot, for example, is both time-consuming and financially expensive. Although some supporters have relatively short memories and the Nobel Peace Prize didn’t help matters much, it was during Barack Obama’s administration that we saw the rise of drones, reinforced by the then-president’s promise that the use of drones was part of a “just war, a war fought proportionately, as a last resort, and in self-defense.” At the same time, geographic distance raised essential questions about the distinction between combatants and noncombatants.
Simultaneously, the nearly twenty years of the first drone era brought a boom in proliferation, during which an estimated 113 countries and 65 other non-state actors gained access to unmanned vehicles. The Second Drone Era (2020 to date) represents a turning point in the proliferation, or “democratization,” of access to drone technology. However, it is during this period that we are no longer referring to the “classic” drones of the past; drones have evolved from large aircraft, similar in size and weight to manned vehicles, to smaller, and even cheaper, vehicles.
Briefly retrospectively, it’s important to emphasize that each country determines its own drone classification, starting with the nomenclature. In Brazil, the term used is Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS), but the UN, specifically the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), uses the term Uncrewed Systems (US), focusing on the complete weapons system, and Uncrewed Aerial Vehicle (UAV), focusing on the vehicle itself. In terms of classification, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) uses a three-class division, which is typically the most widely used in general literature, but this doesn’t prevent each country from developing its own classification system.
Drone Classification – NATO
| Class | Category | Range (km) | Job | Platform Example |
| Class III (> 600 kg) | HALE / MALE / Fight | Unlimited (BLOS) | Strategic / National | Global Hawk |
| Class II (150-600 kg) | Intermediate Tactician | Up to 200 km | Tactical (Division / Brigade) | Orlan-10 |
| Class I (<150 kg) | Small (> 15 kg) | Up to 50 km | Tactical (Battalion / Regiment) | Punisher |
| Mini (< 15 kg) | Up to 25 km | Tactical (Company / Platoon) | DJI Mavic | |
| Micro (<66 J – low weight) | Up to 5 km | Tactical (Platoon / Squad) | FPV / Skyton |
In 2025, when drones are mentioned, thoughts rush to imagine FPV (First-Person View) models or even quadcopters, but about 20 years ago, the story was very different, and what has sparked constant debate within the specialized literature is how much of the change in drone models used on the battlefield is considered revolutionary, innovative, both, or absolutely neither.
If the First Drone Era was marked by distancing itself from Class 3 drones like the Global Hawk, recent years have seen a new way of waging war with drones, with the Ukraine War exemplifying this disruptive model. Today, drones are just another piece of equipment a soldier can carry in his gear, allowing the small device to be with him in the trenches, his eyes in the sky and a silent hunter. Among other factors, the adaptation of commercial platforms (primarily China’s DJI Mavic) and the domestic production of FPV models have enabled this exponential increase in their use by troops on the front lines.
In this case, Ukraine has been using the principle of mass, where quantity is intended to make a difference in a scenario of clear power asymmetry. In other words, drones have been acting as force multipliers. Previously, strategic missions (such as bombing infrastructure centers) were traditionally carried out by Class 3 drones. However, Global Hawks can cost up to $130 million, and this is not a financially sustainable loss in the long term. Today, smaller drones, especially Class 1s, have become central to regular arsenals and have also been integrated into the tactical support of brigades in theaters of operations. As an example, we can take “Operation Spider Web,” carried out on June 1, 2025, where FPV drones formed a coordinated attack against Russian Tupolev bombers stationed at air bases in the Ryazan, Chelyabinsk, Murmansk, Kursk, and Irkutsk regions. Just 177 of these small drones were capable of damaging or disabling approximately 30 percent of Russia’s conventional air capability.
In February 2024, the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (Міністерство оборони України) had already issued a report on its website pointing out the expansion of the industrial base dedicated to the production of drones, which grew from 7 Ukrainian companies producing drones in 2022 to more than 200 in 2024.
Institutional reorganization was fundamental to this boost, and in the Ukrainian case, this occurred after the launch of the program Army of Dronesstill in 2022. This effort integrated government support, with the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Digital Transformation, as well as investment in startups and crowdfunding. In the same 2024 report, according to Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal, the program expects to deliver 1 million drones to the front lines by the end of 2025.
WHY DOES THIS MATTER FOR BRAZIL?
In turn, in the Brazilian scenario, there are examples of technology companies capable of producing internally, such as Nest Design Aerospace, which in March 2025 presented a jet-powered drone model produced entirely in Brazil; and Xmobots, which already has the Nauru 1000C ISTAR, category 2, assisting the Brazilian Army in monitoring Brazilian borders.
It is understandable to consider the Ukrainian case as a basis for lessons and contributions for other countries, especially when analyzing the connection between what we understand about conventional warfare and the possibilities of technological innovations. However, planning, strategic thinking, and institutional coordination are also essential.
The shift in focus in the types of drones used on the battlefield—from an emphasis on large strategic vehicles (Class III) to smaller, cheaper, easily replaceable drones with immediate tactical applications (Class I)—represents a technological shift that Brazil cannot ignore. If the First Drone Era favored a select few countries with access to expensive and complex platforms, the Second Drone Era has brought a kind of democratization of airpower. Any country that can adapt its military apparatus, industry, and doctrine to the new reality can enter a growing market while simultaneously understanding the applications of these devices on the battlefield, and Brazil is at risk of (even further) missing the mark.
Although there are centers of excellence in research and technological innovation spread throughout the country, such as those linked to EMBRAPII (Brazilian Corporation for Industrial Research and Innovation) and public universities with expertise in aeronautical engineering, a national policy for integration, funding, and scale is lacking. The absence of a government program that could unite the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Science, Technology, and Innovation, and the private sector could condemn us to obsolescence in an important field in the context of contemporary military operations.
But it’s not just about war. The Brazilian reality presents multiple contexts in which the intelligent and large-scale adoption of Class 1 and 2 drones could generate significant impacts in sensitive areas of national security.
Environmental monitoring and combating deforestation: mini and micro drones could be distributed to IBAMA and Army teams in operations in the Legal Amazon, enabling persistent surveillance and real-time evidence collection.
Border control: With over 16,000 km of land borders, many of which are vulnerable to drug trafficking, arms trafficking, and smuggling, Brazil requires systems that ensure continuous presence and detection—something feasible with lightweight drones operating in a decentralized manner.
Urban security and combating organized crime: FPV and micro drones can be used by security forces for reconnaissance of conflict zones, tactical surveillance during operations, and intelligence gathering in hard-to-reach urban areas.
Civil Defense and humanitarian missions: Small-scale equipment can also be crucial for locating victims of landslides, mapping flooded areas, and delivering supplies to isolated regions. An example of this was the use of these drones in the 2024 Rio Grande do Sul tragedy.
This plurality of applications reinforces the idea that this is not just a military agenda, but a strategic, cross-cutting, and urgent one. National production capacity must be strengthened not only to meet the needs of the Armed Forces but also to ensure technological sovereignty, reduce external dependencies, and create a cycle of innovation, employment, and autonomy.
Brazil has the human capital, industrial base, and domestic demand to excel in this field. But to do so, it must abandon its reactive stance and take an active role in redesigning its tactical and technological capabilities. The risk of not acting now is becoming hostage to external suppliers, losing regional relevance, and remaining trapped in expensive and slow structures incompatible with the agility required by contemporary conflicts and challenges.
REFERENCES
https://warontherocks.com/2024/11/drones-ai-and-the-changing-nature-of-warfare/
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14751798.2023.2178519
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14751798.2023.2178571
https://www.research-collection.ethz.ch/handle/20.500.11850/690448
