I recently published an international politics analysis for the Österreichisches Institut für Internationale Politik, in which I explored the possibility of an autocracy emerging not from executive aggrandizement, military coup, or even through revolution, but from the capture of the state by Big Tech—a group of hyper-elite economic actors, mostly American, that controls an alarming number of functions that were once state responsibilities across multiple countries. The reflection I conducted there was fruitful and made me consider the implications for Brazil of the post-democratic world envisioned by Peter Thiel, who as early as 2010 imagined a world restructured through technology, without the need for votes. This column stems from that reflection.
Over the past twenty years, Silicon Valley’s logic has infiltrated the machinery of the American state in unprecedented ways. What began as outsourcing and public-private partnerships has evolved into structural dependence: private platforms are no longer mere service providers but critical infrastructure for the government, from intelligence to policy implementation. Silicon Valley now provides not just tools, but the very engine of state operations, becoming indispensable for essential functions.
This phenomenon can be described as a loop of privatization and dependence. The government outsources complex functions to tech companies, creating dependence; dependence generates influence; and influence facilitates further outsourcing. Over time, this cycle reinforces corporate power while reducing the state’s capacity to act independently. Today, companies like Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Meta, and SpaceX not only shape public policy but also implement it. They determine how data is processed, how strategic decisions are made, and in some cases, what actions the state itself can take.
Infrastructure as power
The central difference between historical examples of partial American state capture and present events is infrastructural capture. SpaceX, for example, is not merely a rocket supplier—it in many ways replaces NASA. Since the retirement of the Space Shuttle, the transport of astronauts and supplies to the International Space Station depends on its private capsules and rockets. In 2024, SpaceX launched 83% of all global rockets, and its Starlink satellites account for 65% of the operational constellation. Elon Musk’s power—as owner and CEO of SpaceX—over access to space has become greater than that of any government on the planet, and increasingly strategic: threats to halt launches can impact government missions, military exercises, and scientific exploration, creating an imbalance that would have been historically unthinkable.
In finance, the GENIUS Act and related legislation transform private stablecoins into operational currency, shifting risks onto the public while profits remain private. Here, state dependence on private financial platforms translates into monetary feudalism: the state delegates core functions of monetary sovereignty—previously a monopoly of highly regulated central banks dependent on government oversight—to corporations in exchange for promises of efficiency or innovation.
In cloud computing and artificial intelligence, Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud dominate critical infrastructure. The U.S. government spends billions annually on these platforms, under contracts that make rapid migration or replacement practically impossible—the so-called vendor lock-in. Essential services, from intelligence analysis to social benefit management, rely on these platforms, creating influence that is difficult to regulate.
If the cloud represents the muscles of the state, artificial intelligence is the brain. AI tools interpret data, analyze risk, prioritize decisions, and even predict behavior, replacing cognitive functions that were once exclusively state-controlled. The result is that Big Tech comes to mediate the state’s perception and judgment, not merely its policy implementation. The risk here is epistemological: governments lose independent interpretive frameworks, internalizing the corporate worldview as the basis for public action. To be clear, major decisions about public policy, the economy, and other agendas affecting citizens’ daily lives are increasingly made by machines, using algorithms inherently unpredictable to humans due to their design.
Concrete examples abound. The Department of Immigration relies on data fusion, AI, and biometric platforms to manage mass deportations; tax agencies experiment with automated screening models; health services use private algorithms to determine priorities and allocate resources. In each case, dependence is not only technological—it is structural and cognitive.
The impact is not just domestic. When strategic functions migrate to the private sector, democracy loses operational control. Elections and political mandates assume that the state can act; when execution depends on external companies, accountability is diluted. For Brazil, this translates into strategic vulnerability: alliances based on political trust may be undermined by private interests that do not align with sovereignty or security objectives.
Moreover, Big Tech is already working to shape Brazilian policy, whether through lobbying, think tank funding, advisory boards, or control of digital platforms that structure public debate. Brazil’s technological dependence on American infrastructures—cloud, AI, communications—increases exposure to external pressures and reduces decision-making autonomy.
Paths to resilience
Brazil’s response lies in digital sovereignty: developing its own infrastructure, open standards, and capabilities in cloud, data, and artificial intelligence. This is not about autarky, but strategic resilience. Countries like Denmark illustrate possible approaches: migrating administrative systems to open-source solutions to reduce dependence on foreign private providers.
Of course, Brazil’s capacity in this domain is far below that of the U.S., and technological market competition is unrealistic—but competition is not the point. Rather than striving for technological hegemony, I propose centralizing efforts on producing technologies essential for Brazilian technological sovereignty, thereby reducing dependence on the United States—a power that is increasingly erratic and unpredictable. The urgency is heightened by recent belligerent U.S. actions toward Latin America—from the Trump corollary to the invasion of Venezuela.
In the United States, the cycle continues. Without strategic intervention, privatization-dependence is likely to deepen, strengthening corporate power over essential state functions. In practice, this means democracy operates under conditions of technological dependence, while private companies shape, implement, and interpret public policies.
The challenge is clear: the next frontier of sovereignty is not oil or territory, but control over the state’s cognitive infrastructure. Whoever controls clouds, data, and algorithms will hold the capacity to see, decide, and act—a new form of power that transforms American Big Tech into global sovereigns.
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