The proposal
In one of my first columns for DPolitik, aptly titled “Is Dictatorship Pop(?)” (references below), I briefly touched on the topic of the variety of dictatorships around the world. But this is a subject that deserves a more thorough look, since, as I will argue, this difference is crucial to understanding the variety of political behavior among dictatorships. It is also a vital topic for knowing how to deal with each dictatorship in the best way possible, as reducing them all to just “dictatorships” will inevitably lead to sometimes irreparable errors in diplomatic or analytical efforts.
Therefore, to give the topic the depth it needs to be properly explored, this column will be divided into two parts. The first part – this column – will address the reasons behind the simplification of all dictatorships under the single label “dictatorships,” how this simplification can be harmful in how we deal with different regimes around the world, and finally begin comparing dictatorships by proposing the example of Russia. In the second part -the next column – we will address the second case for comparison, China, and finally discuss how both examples show the extent of diversity within the label “dictatorships” and how ignoring this diversity is harmful. If the reader accepts the proposal, let’s begin!
Simplification
Before we begin the discussion about the variety within the label “dictatorships” itself, it is worth explaining once again the reason behind this simplification, since decision-makers and researchers do not always do it out of malice. When we deal with the unknown, we tend to apply known patterns to it and simplify it so it makes more sense to us. This simplification, natural to human cognitive processes, is called a heuristic. The limitation of these processes is that sometimes an optimal action requires understanding the complexity of the phenomenon, and simplifying it leads to mistakes. Even more dangerous is simplifying something without being aware that we are doing it, making nuanced action much harder.
One might argue that not every phenomenon is complex, or even if it is, not every phenomenon requires a complex understanding. Many phenomena can be explained perfectly through simplification, and simplifying can be enough to take effective action. A classic example in the literature is classifying foods as “hot” or “cold.” In this example, knowing that water boils at 100°C is enough to prepare many dishes—even without knowing the boiling point at different altitudes or the precise composition of ingredients.
But what about dictatorships—can they be effectively simplified into just “dictatorships”? The academic literature on the subject is unanimous in responding: no. Dictatorships do indeed have enough elements in common to be grouped together and separated from “democracies.” Even so, the variation among them is such that some dictatorships operate more similarly to flawed democracies than to other dictatorships. Some even function in ways that are antagonistic to other dictatorships.
Analogously, it would be like saying that humans and whales are the same because they are both mammals. While they do share more in common than mammals and birds do – and are thus grouped together – several medications that work for whales would be lethal for humans. Similarly, military or diplomatic solutions that work for one dictatorship might be disastrous for another.
Despite the consensus that dictatorships differ among themselves, academic literature does not agree on how to classify those differences. Geddes, Wright, and Franz, for example, divide dictatorships into regimes: military, single-party, monarchies, and personalist – also proposing the possibility of hybrid regimes. Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland, however, divide them into only civilian, military, and monarchical – without possible hybrids. Other authors and other classifications could be cited, but the point is clear: there is no consensus.
Regardless of which classification one uses, one thing is clear: there are groups of dictatorships that tend to produce violent foreign policy, greater poverty, higher economic, social, and political inequality, less capacity to combat climate change, and more regional instability. These regimes tend to collapse not into democracy but into other forms of dictatorship. On the other hand, there are groups of dictatorships that are as effective in promoting economic development, social equity, political stability, social pacifism, and environmental policy as corrupt or “defective” democracies. Of course, no dictatorship is as effective as a full democracy. Still, the degree of harm and danger posed by dictatorships varies, and the more and less harmful ones share characteristics that explain their differing behavior.
Still not convinced about the importance of these differences? Then let’s look at two examples that show just how fundamental even minor differences are when it comes to understanding and dealing with dictatorships: Putin’s Russia (1999–present) and post-Mao, pre-Xi China (1976–2012). Let’s begin with the Russian case.
The Russian case (1999–present)
During the Soviet era, the country had a strong, centralized institution responsible for domestic and foreign surveillance and espionage: the Committee for State Security, or KGB (from the Russian Комите́т госуда́рственной безопа́сности). The KGB also served as a check on the traditional military, ensuring that Soviet leaders faced no significant opposition from the armed forces or other political elites. It was, as far as we know, the strongest institution in the Soviet state and directly responsible for its maintenance.
With democratization under Yeltsin, the KGB was seen as a tool of autocracy. Yet, it could not be fully dismantled – it still had vast accumulated power, a huge bureaucratic machine, thousands of employees, and functions still vital to Russia’s new democracy. So it was broken into smaller parts to weaken its influence. The agencies created included the FSK (Federal Counterintelligence Service, or Федеральная служба контрразведки Российской Федерации), the SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service, or Служба внешней разведки), the FSO (Federal Protective Service, or Федеральная служба охраны России), and a range of smaller agencies. The FSK was the direct heir to the KGB, operating from the same building. It was responsible for internal threats (a kind of Russian FBI), while the SVR handled external threats (a kind of Russian CIA), the FSO protected the president, and the smaller agencies handled satellite surveillance, border protection, bunker maintenance, and other police functions.
With the KGB dismantled, its successor agencies became weaker; except for the FSK, most lost political power. The absence of political terror and surveillance allowed for an emerging political opposition. Economic privatization – especially the controversial “loans-for-shares” policy – led to the rise of a new economic elite. The young Russian democracy was still fragile and not yet strong enough to resist authoritarian pressure. Then Putin came along.
In the 1980s, Putin was a KGB agent in East Germany. In the 1990s, he became head of Yeltsin’s FSK, which he renamed the FSB (some say to evoke the KGB’s reputation). Soon after, he led the Security Council of Russia, became prime minister, and in 1999 rose to the presidency – then the most powerful post in Russia.
Once in office, Putin brought the FSB under direct executive control and expanded its powers, budget, and duties. The FSB began reabsorbing smaller agencies that had split from the KGB. Economic elites were rewarded for loyalty to Putin, regardless of party. Those who opposed him were silenced by the FSB. This new elite became the contemporary Russian oligarchy. The FSB was used to fabricate evidence and persecute political opponents, dissidents, journalists, activists, and others supporting Russia’s once-emerging, now-dead democracy.
With less opposition, Putin was free to manipulate the system, offering rewards and power to other security agencies and the Ministry of the Interior, ensuring the entire security apparatus would serve him loyally. Members and former members of this apparatus became known as the Siloviki, and were elevated to Putin’s inner circle, alongside strategic oligarchs, politicians (both from Putin’s party and supposed opposition), and military officers. Many of them had worked with Putin during his time in the KGB or FSK/FSB, creating bonds formed in high-risk situations rarely found in civilian life.
With this power structure, it didn’t matter whether Putin was president or prime minister – power remained personally tied to him. But what about the inner circle – couldn’t they govern too? To answer that, we need to look at the institutional strategies Putin used to ensure that his inner circle could implement decisions, but not make them.
First, Putin assigned overlapping responsibilities to multiple agencies, creating informal competition and rivalry among them and preventing unity against him. For example, the FSB, FSO, SVR, and military all conduct espionage abroad – sometimes with identical missions. It is also common for one agency to arrest members of another. Each is also officially tasked with spying on the others, increasing paranoia and fragmentation.
As for non-security politicians, the logic is similar. Members of opposition parties like the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), A Just Russia – For Truth, and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) are broadly rewarded for loyalty. The benefits of supporting Putin – and the risks of not doing so – ensure their unwavering support. Furthermore, when legislation not critical to Putin is debated – the so-called legislation outside the manual control of the president -, it often favors some politicians over others, fueling internal competition and preventing unity.
Second, ambitious or overly competent agents are periodically replaced by more loyal and less threatening ones. Even inner-circle members are frequently purged. These strategies, rooted in Soviet-era practices, reflect the mindset of a former KGB agent turned national leader.
If all power is centered in one person, what happens if that person dies or becomes incapable of ruling? This is the question posed by Trenin in his book Should We Fear Russia?. In it, he argues that the greatest threat to global security is not necessarily Putin’s foreign policy, but its absence. With Soviet-style structures revived and redesigned to enhance his power, Putin’s death would create a systemic shock and power vacuum that no one could immediately fill.
Trenin likens it to what happened in Libya in 2011 – only multiplied, given Russia’s global power reach. In Libya, Gaddafi was toppled and killed by rebels with NATO support. The country collapsed into chaos, becoming a hub for human trafficking and a migration route to Europe, worsening the Mediterranean migrant crisis (2015–2017).
So Putin controls the political, military, and economic elite – but what about the people? It is widely accepted in the literature that most revolutions and regime changes occur with elite backing. Popular uprisings without elite support are rare. Statistically, then, the people likely occupy little space in Putin’s strategic calculations. Still, there are institutional designs in Russia that shield him from popular unrest.
The first is the presidential veto. This allows the president to blame legislators for unpopular policies (even those initiated by him). When a law becomes too unpopular, he can veto it and appear as the “savior of the common Russian.” Klimovich points to pension reform as an example, which boosted Putin’s image.
The second is parallel institutions. The Public Chamber, for example, partially replaces the legislature by representing civil society in policymaking – though it depends directly on the president. This dependence leads representatives to adapt their demands to Putin’s agenda, not oppose it.
The third is Russia’s electoral system, which includes many forms of manipulation. According to Klimovich, rising opposition figures are silenced; civil and political liberties are restricted to optimize elections for Putin; electoral rules are constantly changed to favor him; and fraud is widespread and unofficially tolerated. Post-Soviet neopatrimonialism (blurring public and private spheres) only worsens this dynamic.
Finally, there is the centralization of the federal model. Russia is a federation, which means that each oblast (like a state or province) should have autonomy to create and implement public policy and allocate federal funds. In practice, however, decisions are centralized. Governors are appointed directly by Putin (often from outside the region), so locals feel unrepresented and unable to organize. Many oblasts receive fewer funds than needed to maintain basic public services, ensuring that local leaders are unpopular and weak.
In the next column…
In the next column, we’ll examine how each of the elements described in Putin’s Russia were manifested in China (1976–2012), and finally compare both cases to understand in practice how differences among dictatorial regimes should inform our political responses and our understanding of them.
References
Cheibub, J. A., Gandhi, J., & Vreeland, J. R. (2010). Democracy and dictatorship revisited. Public Choice, 143(1–2), 67–101. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11127-009-9491-2
Geddes, B., Wright, J., & Frantz, E. (2014). Autocratic breakdown and regime transitions: A new data set. Perspectives on Politics, 12(2), 313–331. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/272010840_Autocratic_Breakdown_and_Regime_Transitions_A_New_Data_Set
Klimovich, S. (2023). Failed democratization to the war against Ukraine: what happened to Russian institutions under Putin? Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, 33: 103-120.
Molinero Junior, G. R. (2025). Is Dictatorship Pop (?). DPolitik. https://dpolitik.com/blog/2025/03/31/a-ditadura-e-pop/
Search Party. (2023, August 18). Why Putin is so hard to overthrow [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e0xbHW_HmV4
Svolik, M. W. (2012). The politics of authoritarian rule. Cambridge University Press.
Trenin, D. (2016). Should we fear Russia? Polity Press.
