At the current stage of world politics, the far-right no longer hides its veneration for the fascist past, but greets it with mass support (just as it did in the past).
2025 begins with a strong boost for the world’s far right. Yesterday, Donald Trump was sworn in for his second term in the White House. During the inauguration festivities, both his first measures and the gestures of his allies (now in government positions) have already made direct reference to the far-rightist politics of the first half of the 20th century, which, incredibly, managed not only to survive almost a century of anti-fascist literacy, but also to regain the support of the masses (without whom the movement is not possible).
While the US, as (still) the world’s largest economy and military power, is dictating various political trends around the globe, it is not being the forerunner of a global movement, but only one of the places where it is developing. Similar to the ‘communist international’, the ‘far-right international’ (as we could call this movement) has been articulating itself in recent years and achieving positive results in the politics of various Western countries, where, until then, the principles of democracy, tolerance and equality had guided national ideologies since the post-World War II era.
Given the history of organised far-left movements, such as the Communist International itself, far-right-wing politicians have spent years ‘denouncing’ the formation of an international coalition of a ‘left-wing elite’ that is influencing world politics, both politically (whereby any party, politician or grouping of this kind preaches Western flags of democracy, equality and tolerance) and economically (whereby philanthropic billionaires are branded ‘globalists’), any party, politician or grouping of this kind that preached the Western banners of democracy, equality and tolerance was labelled a ‘globalist’) as well as an economic one (whereby philanthropic millionaires were ‘controlling their puppets’ to advance their ‘leftist’ agendas).
Now, banners calling for greater (egalitarian) popular participation, tolerance, peace and equality are as old as the bourgeois revolutions of the 17th century onwards. At that time in history, some peoples in Europe were beginning to put a stop to the absolutist control of the old monarchies and were demanding participation in politics. Thus, the first traces of what would later give birth to something similar to what we have in today’s democratic systems emerged. A lot of development (and mishaps) had to take place in order to arrive at something that was more inclusive, and even today the struggle is on to include the majority of a local population, in various territories, in effective political and social participation. Let’s take a look at a brief summary of history.
This is also because the ‘enough’ of these revolutions, as much as it preached political participation and influence of groups other than just the nobility (and the clergy), was more associated with the inclusion of economic elites in the affairs of state. Equality was not to be delegated to everyone, but to one of the most influential circles in society. So, as necessary as these revolutions were for us to get to where we are today, they still perpetrated certain societal ‘vices’ (such as authoritarianism) that fell short of the ideals preached by the West in recent times.
Over time, however, equality and tolerance became more widespread, encompassing the broadest group of the population of countries, founding (in a summarised way) what we call ‘liberal democracy’, where power emanates from the people, but the law prevails to protect them from the tyranny of the masses.
It’s interesting to note that from the very first moment that there was a greater cry for ‘equality’ from groups other than the nobility and the clergy, there were opposing movements that, on the one hand, tried to delegitimise these flags and, on the other, acted to prevent them from being consolidated. Just as the group of people in a society who can actively participate in national politics has grown over the decades and centuries, so too has the group of those who want to prevent this group from growing even further. These are commonly referred to in political science studies as ‘reactionaries’, i.e. those who react against change and preach the prevalence of the status quo. In more popular parlance, they are simply called ‘conservatives’.
Although ‘conservatism’ can mean the conservation of a wide range of interests (not all of which are necessarily anti-people), throughout history it has been a bias that has summarily ruled out increasing the group of people who might have more political rights and (effective) social participation in societies. It’s no coincidence that the term ‘conservatism’ in politics originated with the Bourbon Restoration in 1818, when people were fighting to reverse the effects of the French Revolution. Conservative movements tend to try to keep their actions in politics ‘clean’ (publicly), most of the time reserving their influence behind the scenes and avoiding ‘more public scenes’. After all, these groups are reactionaries, not revolutionaries.
But at times in history, conservatism has given rise to movements that were, in fact, revolutionary. One of the first conservative, anti-revolutionary movements (which in itself was revolutionary) was the so-called Bonapartism. Revolutionary because, as a by-product of the French Revolution, Napoleon took power by striking a blow against the revolutionaries and subsequently became an absolutist monarch. Bonapartism, as a movement recognised after the fall of Napoleon I, is based on the support of a charismatic leader who, through his charisma, garners support from both the masses and the elites, mainly advancing the interests of the latter with the support of the former.
Bonapartism would also have found a foothold in Germany (or what would become the country) in the form of Otto von Bismarck. Better recognised as the ‘unifier of Germany’, the ‘Iron Chancellor’ (as he became known) was not a fan of democracy, which was still in its infancy in the newly formed country, and ruled based on the interests of his elitist class, the Junkers – Prussia’s large landowners. Although Bismarck’s government is more associated with peace in Europe than with war, especially when compared to the policies of the German state under William II, who had no passion for Bismarck and removed him as Chancellor when he came to power, he maintained internal policies of persecution against Catholics, Poles and other minority groups.
In the brand new 20th century, however, what was identified at first glance as a new expression of Bonapartism went so far over the top that it came to be called by the name coined by its creator: Fascism. Originating in the Italian word ‘bundle’, referring to ‘Fighting Bands’, fascism, created by the Italian Benito Mussolini, does presuppose a charismatic leader, but it goes further, subordinating the population of a state to a militaristic autocracy, where individual interests are suppressed in favour of the good of the ‘nation’. Further north in Italy, the cradle of fascism, another political leader would develop this concept further, adding the preponderant concept of ‘race’. Adolf Hitler, soon after taking over the ‘German Workers’ Party‘, which, unusually, was an extreme right-wing party during the Weimar regime in Germany in 1919, led to the formation of the new “National Socialist German Workers” Party’ (NSDAP). The Nazi party was openly opposed to democracy and the left (with whom it also associated the democratic regime as a whole). Nazism is thus based on fascism, but adds the attribute of race as a preponderant element.
While Bonapartism maintained an association with the economic elites, above all by advancing their interests through the support of the masses (who usually didn’t benefit from this), fascism has a problematic relationship with capitalism. While both Mussolini and Hitler were strongly opposed to capitalism (either because of its consumerist and ‘non-national’ bias, for the former, or because it was ‘something Jewish’, for the latter), both tended to associate themselves with capitalists and use the system instrumentally to achieve their goals. In practice, as long as the capitalists followed what the leaders defined as the ‘national interest’, the fascist state would tolerate it.
And here there is a fundamental difference in the treatment of oligarchies within a far-rightist and far-leftist regime. In the former, capitalists can not only exist, they can thrive. In the latter, read communism or socialism, they are not tolerated, since the basis of their ideology is the end of capitalism. For fascism, capitalism is only bad as long as it is ‘anti-national’ (or ‘anti-race’).
You can see why capitalists can dialogue with (and may prefer) fascists, but fear (and can fight against) communists.
With the end of the Second World War, fascism as a ‘legitimate’ ideology was expunged from ‘traditional’ political discourse. Of course, the war is sold today as having been a clash between ‘democracy’ and ‘authoritarianism’. However, the Second World War actually developed on the basis of a clash between those who wanted to maintain the world order as it was and those who wanted to revolutionise it (i.e. the Axis countries).
It should be noted that the world order in force at the time, although democratic in many countries, was not similar to the post-war order, where the issue of equality and inclusion became the centrepiece of Western democracies. In most democracies, only men could participate politically. In several US states, there were laws in place that were used as inspiration for Nazi policies to exclude Jews and other minorities in Germany. European powers still strongly maintained their colonial policy in Africa and Asia, exploiting the local populations. The conflict only began when Hitler decided to rewrite the map of Europe and throw the world order (dictated by Western Europe) in the bin.
After the destruction wrought between 1939 and 1945, fascism was banned from Germany and other European countries, but its core remained in the USA, for example. In Brazil itself, which fought on the side of the Allies, a fascist dictator ruled. The story of a war against authoritarianism was only sold later in the annals of history.
This point is important above all because, while the title of the ideology itself had become taboo, its ideas continued to haunt the world. The decades of the Cold War brought many advances to Europe with the development of welfare states, much of which was created as a disincentive to the communism that was trying to win hearts and minds around the world. With the fall of the Soviet bloc in the 1990s, some even announced ‘the end of history’, with the victory of capitalism as the economic model and liberal democracy as the political model par excellence.
But the successive crises (economic, social and war) of the late 2000s and early 2010s caused different countries around the world, but especially in the West, to start bubbling over socially. With what had been taken for granted (i.e. rights and the welfare state) threatened by crises of various kinds, demagogues returned to using old tools from the fascist playbook. You have to realise, however, that this wasn’t just something that happened in the 2010s. Other waves of the far-right took place between 1945 and 2000. The difference with the new wave is that it has achieved something that the others couldn’t: it has entered traditional politics.
In several Western countries, far-right-wing politicians and parties are no longer just ‘protest movements’. They have become real political forces that have either achieved power or are very close to it. What’s more, in the midst of the crisis of traditional politics (centre-left and centre-right), which prevailed in the post-World War II era, these parties have gained so much in popularity that other traditional parties, especially on the centre-right, have come to see this type of politics as a valid way of promoting themselves.
And so what we see today is that in countries such as Brazil, Germany, the United Kingdom or the Netherlands, politicians from the centre-right or the right began to move towards the far-right with great strides in the 2010s. At the beginning of the 2020s, it is already considerably difficult to differentiate between traditional right-wing and far-right-wing discourse in many of these countries. Examples include the CDU in Germany, the Conservative Party in the UK, the VVD in the Netherlands and even the PSDB in Brazil. These are all centre-right parties that have partially (but with considerable membership) adopted the rhetoric of the far-right. On the other hand, as the far-right discourse became popularised, far-right leaders stood out and reached large masses of people. This is the case with Bolsonaro in Brazil and Trump in the USA.
Meanwhile, the expression ‘dog whistle’ has become something commonly observed in politics. This term refers to gestures or slogans used by politicians or prominent figures that covertly allude to ideals that are understood by members of a group. In Brazil, for example, a secretary of state (during the Bolsonaro government) made a video that referred to a video of one of Hitler’s ministers (Joseph Goebbels). This type of action promotes the values that the propagandists want to pass on to those who understand these messages and, on the other hand, normalises an aesthetic, actions or rhetoric among the general population, making it increasingly accepted.
When denounced, those who make use of this type of expedient usually defend themselves by claiming that they ‘didn’t do anything’. This is the greatest asset of this type of action.
At the beginning of 2025, far-rightists no longer need ‘dog whistles’. What we see today is that fascist rhetoric has become so popularised that it is no longer necessary to ‘speak only to their own’. The general public is increasingly accepting fascist messages as ‘normal’.
The reaction of many users of newspapers, magazines or television channels to the news aimed at showing that the type of action taken by a certain politician or prominent figure is done through anti-liberal language is already one of denial and blame. We have finally arrived at the Nazi greeting given by the new member of Donald Trump’s government, billionaire Elon Musk.
Photos of the gesture have already crossed the globe and created a buzz that divides those who see ‘nothing much’ in the gesture (or try to justify it by claiming that it was a ‘Roman greeting’ or that it was a ‘mistake’, since Musk has autism) and those who, once again, denounce the gesture as something openly fascist. In fact, the best interpretation is that there is no debate and not even any doubt. The days of the ‘dog whistle’ are behind us. Musk giving a Nazi salute in the middle of a televised event (more than once) is a clear symbol of the message he wants to convey.
The fact that this type of action is denied (as many do) is just a realisation that something that would have been abhorrent a few years ago has become commonplace and normal. The current state of affairs is that there are openly fascist figures in the US government. Which, once again, doesn’t seem to be exclusive to the US. In Germany, while the far-right-wing party ‘Alternative for Germany’ (AfD), which is officially considered ‘right-wing extremist’ in some German states and has neo-Nazis among its leading figures, shares ‘deportation tickets’ for immigrants as a campaign leaflet, following the example of the defunct Nazi party (which did the same with Jews), the centre-right party has its president (and probable future chancellor) declaring that some people’s German citizenship should be withdrawn if the authorities realise that ‘there has been a mistake in giving citizenship to a foreigner’.
These are examples of how the far-right (and some parts of the traditional right) no longer need to hide what they actually want to implement: an anti-liberal and anti-democratic plan. What’s more, the endorsement of this type of policy by American economic elites, the so-called ‘big techs’ (as seen with Musk or Zuckerberg) is just another facet of what was seen in the 1930s.
Once again, what we see is that big capitalists, faced with the prospect of perhaps having their interests changed by others, meaning a significant loss (for them), prefer to just alter course a little and join far-right-wing movements that, at worst, tolerate them, but, at best, make them prosper even more.
The beginning of 2025 therefore brings with it the dawn of a new era in which the far-right, organised internationally, no longer have to try to put a ‘liberal’ (i.e. egalitarian or democratic) gloss on their political proposals. As one could say, ‘the gates are open’. It is therefore advisable to hold on to your hats for the times to come.
